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unskidled  workers  grow  only  slowly  (the  poor  benefit,  but not
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proportionately.  Meanwhile,  modem  economic  growth  may
erode traditional  entitlements  that se  e  as safety nets in
preindustrial  societies.
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*  Background  paper  for the World  Development  Report  1990.  The authoi
acknowledge  with gratitude the help gien by Bela Balassa,  George  Boyer,  Gary Fields,
Joan Hannon,  Mary Mackinnon,  Cynthia Taft Morris, and Lyn Squire.I. THINKING  ABOUT  POVERTY  AND  INDUSTRIALIZATION
Does industriali'  -ion  increase  or decrease  poverty?  There  has  been  much
debate  among  '.ird  World  analysts  on this  question  of late.  Debate  on the  same
question  attracted  even  more  attention  as the  First  Industrial  Revolution
unfolded  in Britain  in the  early  19th  century,  and  it hasn't  diminished  much
since.  Pessimists  say  it increased  poverty  while  optimists  say  it didn't.  An
outside  observer  might  well  be puzzled  that  there  is a debate  at all.  After
all,  what's  the  counterfactual?  Are the  pessimists  really  arguing  that  tbings
would  have  been  better  for  the  poor  without  an industrial  revolution?  Can  any
pessimist  really  believe  that  slower  growth  is better  for  the  poor  than  faster
growth?  While  the  answers  might  seem  obvious  at first  blush,  it  turns  out  that
the  pessimists  deserve  our  careful  attention.  What  we want  to show  in  this
essay  is that  even  if the  answers  are  "no"  in  both  cases,  just  how  much
poverty  is  eradicated  by industrialization  depends  very  much  on the  form  that
industialization  takes.  The  better  we understand  that  historical  moral,  the
better  will  we be equipped  to understand  how  contemporary  economic  growth  in
the  Third  World  can  aid  or impede  its  progress  with  poverty  eradication.
There  are  two  questions  that  this  essay  confronts.  First,  what  happened
to the  share  in poverty,  and  to their  living  standards,  during  19th  century
industrial  revolutions?  Second,  why  did  poverty  statistics  behave  the  way
they  did?  The  first  question  is easier,  and  we start  tbere.
A recent  book  by Cynthia  Taft  Norris  and  Irma  Adelman  (1988)  makes  it
clear  to us that  qualitative  evidence  simply  will  not  do.  They  assert  with
what seems  to us unsupported  confidence  that  poverty  was  worse  in those
countries  where  industrialization  and  growth  was  more  rapid  --  as in  Britain
and  Belgium  --  than  in countries  where  industrialization  and  growth  was slower
-1---  as  in  Switzerland  or  France.  They  base  their  assertions  on  qualitative
evidence.  Comparative  assessments  of  poverty  are  difficult  enougb  in  the  1980s
to  expect  them  tt  we  any  better  a  century  ego.  Adelman  and  Morris  may  turn  out
to  be  right,  but  quantitative  comparative  conclusions  are  hasty  on  the  basis
of  the  qualitative  evidenc'  ow  available.
The  facts  are  that  I  are  is  as  yet  no  data  which  makes  it  possible  to
compare  the  numbers  in  poverty  across  nations  in  the  19th  century,  let  alone
the  living  standards  of  the  poor.  Thus,  this  essay  will  limit  its  coverage  to
changes  in  poverty  over  time  where  comparative  judgments  are  more  tractable.
While  other  countries  are  more  poorly  documented,  we  are  able  to  get  some
impression  of  trends  in  and  composition  of  19th  century  British  and  American
poverty  by  exploiting  official  statistics  on  poor  relief.  What  little  we  do
know  about  otber  countries  does  not  appear  to  conflict  with  British  and
American  experience.  Use  of  official  statistics  on  poor  relief  is  fraught  with
difficulties,  some  of  whicb  will  be  discussed  below  in  Section  III,  but,  in
combination  with  the  famous  poverty  surveys  done  by  Booth,  Rowntree,  and
others,  they  at  least  give  us  some  basis  on  which  to  assess  poverty.
Unfortunately,  it  is  very  difficult  to  identify  changes  in  the  composition  of
the  poor  by  this  means,  but  we  can  get  static  impressions  of  wbo  was  poor  at
various  points  in  time.  Indeed,  it  is  more  useful  to  look  at  how  certain
groups  were  affected  by  industrialization  than  to  search  for  some  elusive
statistics  documenting  overall  poverty.
The  second  question  is  harder.  Now  might  industrialization  and  modern
economic  growth  diminish  poverty?  On  the  face  of  it,  the  answer  eeems  obvious.
If  by  growth  we  mean  an  increase  in  per  capita  income,  and  if  there  is  no
cbanae  in  the  distribution  of  that  income,  then  by  definition  the  incomes  of
the  poor  will  rise  along  with  everyone  else,  and  the  rate  of  escape  from
poverty  will  exhibit  the  same  performance.  This  "trickle  down"  theorem
-2-suggests  that  it  is  not  possible  to  discuss  the  relation  between  growth  and
poverty  without  discussing  its  effect  on  distribution.  Has  the  rise  in
inequality  beea  so  severe  in  the  past  that  the  percent  in  poverty  could  have
risen  and  the  average  living  standards  among  the  poor  diminished?  Such  results
would  have  required  severe  inequality  trends  indeed,  but  it  is  important  to
understand  that  the  forces  driving  inequality  are  similar  to  the  forces
driving  poverty  statistics.  While  rising  inequality  may  not  necessarily  imply
increasing  poverty,  it  may  imply  a  slow  rate  of  escape  from  poverty.  Thus,
Section  It  will  dwell  at  length  on  19th  century  experience  with  inequality
among  the  industrializing  NICs  of  that  time.  This  is  a  story  about  relatives,
that  is,  the  performance  of  the  poor  relative  to  the  rich.  Central  to  that
story  is  understandirg  the  forces  of  supply  and  demand  that  kept  the  wages  of
the  unskilled  poor  low.  At  the  end  of  that  section,  we  will  also  explore  what
happened  to  the  living  standards  of  the  poor.  This  is  a  story  about  absolutes,
that  is,  the  rate  of  poverty  reduction.  It  appears  that  the  same  forces  of
supply  and  demand  which  drove  inequality  also  conditioned  the  rate  of  poverty
eradication.
It  should  also  be  stressed  that  modern  economic  growth  can  affect  poverty
in  both  direct  and  indirect  ways.  The  direct  influence  has  already  been
stated:  if  incomes  of  the  poor  rise  along  with  the  average,  then  poverty  can
be  said  to  have  diminished.  The  indirect  influence  takes  account  of  the  fact
that  much  of  the  poverty  which  we  observe  in  both  the  19th  century  and  today
occurs  at  predictable  stages  in  an  individual's  life  cycle.  The  incidence  of
poverty  is  greatest  among  those  who  are  not  full  income  earners  like  the  aged,
or  among  those  subject  to  crisis  like  the  sick  or  widowed.  It  is  a  mistake  to
infer  that  higber  incomes  have  no  indirect  impact  on  such  individuals  who  are
cut  off  from  the  market  economy.  After  all,  even  the  working  poor  who  receive
higher  incomes  should  be  better  able  to  save  more  for  crises  and  old  age.  The
-3-growth  and  wider  access  of  financial  institutions  for  saving,  credit,  and
insurance  should  help  even  poor  individuals  spread  their  lifetime  incomes
over  thei-  lifetime  needs.  Furthermore,  a  richer  society  can  be  expected  to  be
willing  and  able  transfer  more  resources  to  those  in  need  whether  by  stats
intervention,  by  private  charity,  or  by  intra-family  transfers.  However,
neither  of  these  indirect  potential  connections  between  higher  incomes  and
poverty  were,  in  fact,  manifested  in  ways  that  helped  the  poor  very  much  in
the  19th  century.  Access  to  formal  capital  market  institutions  did  not  always
develop  rapidly  enough  to  replace  disappearing  "traditional"  means  of  income
support  for  the  poor.  And  during  early  industrial  revolutions  in  the  19th
century  laissez  faire  policies  often  served  to  reduce  or  even  remove  state
interventions  which  had  previously  transfered  resources  to  the  poor.  We  shall
have  more  to  say  about  this  in  Section  IV.
There  are  four  ways  that  poverty  might  actually  increase  during  early
industrial  revolutions,  all  of  which  will  get  some  attention  in  this  essay.
First,  the  living  standards  of  the  poor  may  fall  and  inequality  rise  in
response  to  technological  events  driving  industrial  revolutions.  Second,  the
cost  of  living  facing  the  poor  may  rise  more  dramatically  for  exactly  the  same
reasons,  eroding  their  living  standards  in  ways  which  conventional  income
statistics  may  fail  to  capture.  Third,  early  industrial  revolutions  may
undermine  both  the  earning  potential  of  secondary  unskilled  workers  and  the
secondary  earning  sources  of  primary  unskilled  workers.  Fourth,  modern
economic  growth  may,  in  Amartya  Sen's  language,  erode  traditional  entitlements
which  serve  as  safety  nets  in  pre-industrial  societies.  Let  us  dwell  a
moment  on  each  of  these.
The  most  important  way  that  early  industrialization  might  raise  poverty,
or  at  least  inhibit  its  eradication,  is  if  rising  inequality  is  associated
with  early  industrialization.  Ve  bave  a  name  for  this  hypothesis  --  the
-4-Kuznets  Curve.  Section  II  will  show  that  there  is  abundant  evidence  supporting
a  19th  century  upswing  of  a  Kuznets  Curve,  at  least  in  Britain  and  America.
Furthermore,  inequality  seems  to  have  been  driven  by  technological  forces
which  were  unskilled  labor  saving,  a  view  stressed  by  Marx  and  explored  at
length  by  development  economists  in  the  1960s  and  19709.  The  derived  demand
for  unskilled  labor  simply  does  not  share  equally  in  the  brom  for  other
primary  inputs  --  like  land,  skills,  and  capital  --  during  early  industrial
revolutions.  And  if  the  working  poor  suffer,  those  in  extreme  poverty  will
suffer  even  more.  There  appear  to  have  been  two  related  forces  wbich  produced
the  unskilled  labor  saving.  First,  those  sectors  which  enjoyed  rapid
technological  advance  and  output  growth  were  capital  and  skill  intensive
driving  up  the  derived  demand  for  both,  while  the  unskilled  poor  lagged  behind
or  were  in  some  cases  actually  displaced.  Second,  physical  capital  and  skills
were  complements  so  that  rapid  accumulation  augmented  the  demand  for  skills
far  more  than  for  unskilled  labor.  In  short,  unskilled  labor  saving
technological  progress  tended  to  retard  the  growth  in  unskilled  labor  demand,
inequality  rose,  and  the  poor  failed  to  share  in  economic  progress.
There  is  a  tendency  in  writing  about  19th  century  poverty,  as  well  as
contemporary  Third  World  poverty,  to  associate  low-wage  job, ith  poverty,
offering  the  empty  conclusion  that  low  pay  had  a  deleterious  effect  on  the
poor  (Treble,  1979).  It  is  surely  a  mistake  to  blame  the  existence  of  poverty
on  ths  existence  of  low-wage  jobs  in  what  were  then  called  the  "sweated
trades"  or  casual  employment  in  what  we  now  call  the  informal  service  sector.
After  all,  how  would  the  poor  have  been  affected  if  such  low-wage  jobs  wer4
unavailable?  Instead,  we  should  try  to  isolate  the  forces  of  demand  and  supply
for  unskilled  labor  which  resulted  in  such  low  wages,  as  well  as  those  forces
which  made  access  to  the  sweated  trades  or  casual  service  sector  employment
the  only  source  of  jobs  for  many  of  the  working  poor.
-5-There  is  a  second,  and  directly  related,  way  that  early  industrial
revolutions  can  inhibit  poverty  eradication.  Technical  change  during  early
industrial  revolutions  in  the  19th  century  was  slowest  in  those  activities
which  produced  goods  and  services  which  figured  most  prominantly  in  the
budgets  of  the  poor.  The  two  most  important  of  these  were  food  and  urban
housing.  The  terms  of  trade  between  farm  and  nonfarm  goods  rose  across  most  of
the  19th  century,  so  that  food  became  relatively  expensive,  driving  up  the
cost  of  living  of  the  poor  relative  to  higher  income  classes  for  whom  the  food
expenditure  share  was  much  smaller.  The  source  of  this  long  run  trend  was  not
the  Beckscher-Ohlin  theorem,  so  popular  in  trade  theory,  but  rather  unbalanced
productivty  advance  favoring  nonfarm  sectors  combined  with  inelastic  land
supplies.  Land  scarcity  and  technological  events  mattered  most.  Furthermore,
the  relative  cost  of  urban  housing  rose  by  even  more.  This  was  again  partly
due  to  land  scarcity  in  the  booming  cities,  but  also  due  to  the  fact  that  the
building  industry  exhibited  one  of  the  slowest  rates  of  technological  advance.
Rents  soared,  and  the  poor  were  most  significantly  affected  since  expenditure
on  even  their  blighted  and  modest  housing  were  so  much  larger  as  a  share  of
their  family  budgets  than  among  the  higher  income  classes.  And  high  and  rising
rents  encouraged  the  poor  to  search  for  ever-cheaper  dwellings,  encouraging
them  to  crowd  into  lower  quality  housing  which  augmented  mortality,  morbidity,
and  their  ability  to  work.  We  do  not  measure  such  environmental  deterioration
very  well,  but  it  seems  to  bave  been  manifested  by  a  decline  in  nutritional
status  and  physical  well-being  during  the  industrial  revolution  (Fogel,  1989).
While  the  intra-urban  transport  revolution  did  gradually  increase  the
distances  over  which  people  could  travel  to  work,  making  it  increasingly
possible  to  escape  the  worst  slums  by  moving  to  the  more  benign  periphery,  it
did  not  keep  pace  with  the  pressure  of  urbanization.  Thus,  the  poor  tended  to
concentrate  in  the  environmentally  deprived  central  core  of  19th  century
-6-cities  rather  than  at  the  periphery  as  is  true  in  Third  World  squatter
settlements  today.  ThiL  plus  government  neglect  of  urban  infrastructure  served
to  heighten  the  notorious  crowding  and  slum  living  of  the  early  19th  century
urban  toot,  a  quality  of  urban  life  even  lower  than  that  observed  for  the
worst  Third  World  cities.  In  short,  the  same  foxces  that  tend  to  produce
income  inequality  during  early  industrial  revolutions  also  tend  to  raise he
relative  cost  of  living  of  the  poor  --  industrialization  in  the  19th  century
cheapened  the  goods  that  the  poor  produced  relative  to  the  goods  that  the  poor
consumed.
Despite  the  importance  of  these  forces  in  creating  greater  inequality
during  19th  century  industrial  revolutions,  they  have  not  been  stressed  by
most  pessimists  in  the  debate  over  poverty  and  industrialization.  Before
moving  on  to  the  other  forces  which  may  have  contributed  to  slow  progress  with
poverty  eradication  early  in  the  industrial  revolution,  it  is  worth
reiterating  that  beneath  the  working  poor  were  the  extreme  poor  who  were
represented  disproportionately  by  the  old,  the  sick,  large  families,  and
female-headed  households.  Row  do  those  who  argue  that  growth  increased  poverty
view  its  impact  on  these  specific  groups?  We  need  some  answers,  even  though
historians  often  ignore  them  while  focusing  instead  on  the  working  poor.  It
can  be  argued,  for  example,  that  it  was  the  old  which  were  most  vulnerable
when  a  sector  was  perturbed  by  technical  change,  by  the  development  of  new
markets,  or  by  some  price  shock.  The  reason  is  that  they  had  already  invested
in  human  capital  that  was  specific  to  that  sector,  like  the  oft-cited  handloom
weavers  in  early  19th  century  Britain.  It  was  also  harder  for  the  old  to
migrate  since  they  had  invested  in  their  location  and  had  a shorter  future
life  span  over  which  to  recoup  the  cost  of  the  move.
This  essay  will,  therefore,  consider  more  generally  how  technical  change
affected  the  demand  for  old  labor,  child  labor,  and  female  labor.  We  are  not
-7-able  to  report  definitive  historical  findings  on  this  crucial  question  yet,
but  a  key  consideration  will  be  the  fate  of  the  cott4ge  or  domestic
industries.  These  industries  were  and  are  very  important  to  the  economic
status  of  the  poor.  Domestic  industries  were  and  are  intensive  in  their  use  of
female,  child,  and  old  labor  and  hence  important  income  sources  for  vulnerable
groups.  They  were  often  low  skill  (and  especially  low  strength),  and  they
could  be  and  are  undertaken  alongside  child  care  in  the  home  where  the  pace  of
production  was  self-regulated.  These  industries  were  often  an  important
secondary  income  source  for  the  family  that  took  on  extra  impor nce  Ouring
agricultural  slack  seasons,  during  periods  of  low  market  employment,  and
during  periods  of  food  crisis.  The  rise  of  the  factory  and  the  development  of
integrated  commodity  markets  tended  to  eliminate  these  cottage  industries.
That  fact  is  much  stressed  by  pessimists  in  the  standard  of  living  debate,  and
Section  III  will  dwell  on  it  at  length.
The  other  chief  way  in  which  early  industrialization  might  create
increased  distress  among  the  poor  is  if  there  is  an  erosion  of  traditional
means  of  support  and  Sen-like  entitlements.  Although  modernization  theorists
stress  different  forces,  most  of  them  make  mucb  of  the  long  lag  between  the
destruction  of  traditional  support  systems  and  their  replacement  by  modern
transfer  mechanisms  (Sen,  1981):  for  example,  the  erosion  of  the  village
"moral  economy"  (Scott,  1976);  the  breakup  of  the  extended  family  and  the  rise
of  "individualization"  (MacFarlane,  1978);  and  the  increased  importance  of
migration  generating  "child  default"  on  parental  investment  (Sunderson  and
David,  1986;  Williamson,  1986).  Within  these  entitlement-erosion  themes  are  a
number  of  important  claims,  some  of  which  will  oe  discussed  in  Section  IV.
Lindert  (1989)  argues  that  significant  transfer  systems  were  not  introduced  in
the  RICs  of  the  past  until  the  20th  century,  partly  in  response  to  the  fact
that  econoric  conditions  of  the  poor  began  to  catch  up  with  the  rest  of  the
-8-economy  on  the  downside  of  the  iuzuets  Curve,  tbus  increasing  their  political
voice.  Others  argue  the  contrary,  and  that  government  intervenion  was
extensive  --  although  local  --  even  in  pre-industrial  societies.  This  debate
should  tell  us  much  about  attitudes  0owards  poverty  and  how  their  evolution
might  be  expected  in  the  Third  world  if  they  obey  the  same  historical  laws.
There  is,  of  course,  the  role  of  policy  to  consider.  Section  TV  will  have
quite  a  bit  to  say  about  this  issue,  in  particular  19th  century  experience
with  what  Michael  Lipton  (1976)  calls  the  urban  bias,  and  what  Theodore
Schultz  (1964)  and  others  sincc  have  called  the  squeeze  agriculture  policy.
These  and  other  policies  matter,  and  most  l9th  contury  industrializers  appear
to  have  adopted  policies  surprisingly  similar  to  the  ones  which  the  Third
World  bas  adopted,  policies  that  poverty-oriented  economists  have  consistently
criticized.
Having  suggested  the  main  ways  in  which  early  industrialization  might
increase  poverty,  or  at  least  inhibit  its  eradicaton,  a  central  issue  should
be  emphasized.  It  is  not  economic  growth  per  se  that  is  sometimes  said  to  make
the  poor  poorer,  but  ratber  the  processes  and  policies  that  are  associated
with  various  growth  regimes  that  matter.  These  pr"e&sses  may  themselves  be
regarded  as  facilitating  industrialization  or  as  its  joint  product.  Having
said  as  much,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  kind  of  arguments  sometimes  put  foward
by  the  optimists  are  simply  not  relevant  to  the  claims  put  foward  by  the
pessimists.  For  example,  in  a  recent  survey  for  the  World  Bank  Gary  Fields
(1989)  compares  changes  in  the  poverty  share  between  Third  World  countries
exhibiting  rapid  growth  and  those  exhibiting  stagnation.  Be  concludes
tentatively  that  the  poor  did  better  during  periods  of  rapid  growth.
Similarly,  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisors  "discovered'  in  1964  that  the
share  in  poverty  declined  by  more  in  periods  of  rapid  American  growth.  But  no
one  ever  suggested  that  the  poor  do  better  when  an  economy  is  stagnating  than
-9-when  it  is  booming  --  given  the  economic  structure  and  policy  environment.
Surely  rapid  growth  is  better  than  slow  growth  in  eradicating  poverty,  given
the  economic  structure  and  policy  environment.  Rather,  the  issue  is  how
changes  in  that  structure  and  policy  environment  can  affect  the  poor.  When
looking  at  slumps  in  the  short  run,  or  at  growth  retardation  in  the  medium
term,  a  more  relevant  question  to  ask  is  whether  industrial  revolutions  result
in  a  greater  collapse  in ncome  and  employment  among  the  poor,  and  whether  it
results  in  their  diminished  capacity  to  survive  those  episodes.
This  is  an  ambitious  set  of  questions  to  ask  of  19th  century  experience
with  industrial  revolutions.  And  despite  the  attention  which  historians  have
paid  to  them  since  Britain  started  the  First  Industrial  Revolution,  history
yields  the  answers  only  with  great  reluctance.  Yet,  a  survey  of  what  we  do
know  may  still  help  place  contemporary  Third  World  debate  in  perspective.
What,  then,  does  19th  century  experience  tell  us  about  the  connection  between
poverty,  policy,  and  industrialization?
-10-II. INEQUALITY  DURING  PAST INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTIONS
Before  we can  talk  about  poverty,  we need to  understand  what  history
tells  us about  inequality.  It's  important  to understand  first  the
industrial  revolutionary  forces  driving  inequality  because  they  illustarte
best  the  determinants  of poverty  eradication,  namely  the  demand  for  and
supply  of unskilled  labor.  Having  done  so,  we shall  be better  equipped  to
return  to the  poverty  theme  in Section  III.
The  Kuzuets  Curve:  Contemporary  Cross-Sections  Once  Nore
More  than  tbree  decades  ago,  Simon  Kuzuets  (1955)  noted  that  income
inequality  seemed  to have  declined  in the  industrialized  nations  across  the
mid-20th  centur.?,  and  ventured  the  guess  that  it bad  risen  earlier  just  as the
critics  o, capitalism  had  asserted.  While  Kuznets  was  drawing  on limited
historical  evidence,  others  rose to  his  challenge  by pursuing  the  more
abundant  cross-sectional  evidence.'  Felix  Paukert  (1973),  Hollis  Chenery  and
his  World  Bank team (1974),  Nontek  Ahluvalia  (1976;  1980),  and  Edmar  Bacha
(1979),  all  thought  they  saw  contemporary  cross-section  evidence  supporting
the  Kuznets  Curve,  namely  that  income  inequality  first  rose  and  then  declined
with  development.
The  Kuznets  Curve  is illustrated  in Figure  1,  based  on Ahluwalia's  World
Bank sample.  A quadratic  fits  this  60-country  sample  fairly  well,  where  the
inequality  statistic  is simply  the  income  share  of the  top  20%.  The  underlying
data can  and  have  been  criticized.  Indeed,  some  have argued  that  the  data is
much  too  fragile  to resolve  the  debate.  But  whatever  your  position  on the
issue  of data  quality,  two  morals  leap  out  from  Figure  1. First,  the  more
robust  portion  of the  Kuznets  Curve  lies  to the  right:  income  inequality  falls
-11-II.  INEQUALITY  DURING  PAST  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTIONS
Before  we  can  talk  about  poverty,  we  need  to  understand  what  history
tqlls  us  about  inequality.  It's  important  to  understand  first  the
i  lustrial  revolutionary  forces  driving  inequality  because  they  illustarte
best  the  determinants  of  poverty  eradication,  namely  the  demand  for  and
supply  of  unskilled  labor.  Having  done  so,  we  shall  be  better  equipped  to
return  to  the  poverty  theme  in  Section  III.
The  Kuznets  Curve:  Contemporary  Cross-Sections  Once  More
More  than  three  decades  ago,  Simon  Kuznets  (1955)  noted  that  income
inequality  seemed  to  have  declined  in  the  industrialized  nations  across  the
mid-2Oth  century,  and  ventured  the  guess  that  it  bad  risen  earlier  just  as  the
critics  of  capitalism  had  asserted.  While  Kuznets  was  drawing  on  limited
historical  evidence,  others  rose  to  his  challenge  by  pursuing  the  more
abundant  cross-sectional  evidence.  Felix  Paukert  (1973),  Rollis  Chenery  and
his  World  Bank  team  (1974),  Nontek  Ahluwalia  (1976;  1980),  and  Edmar  Bacha
(1979),  all  thought  they  saw  contemporary  cross-section  evidence  supporting
the  Kuznets  Curve,  namely  that  income  inequality  first  rose  and  then  declined
with  development.
The  Kuznets  Curve  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  based  on  Ahluwalia's  World
Bank  sample.  A  quadratic  fits  this  60-country  sample  fairly  well,  where  the
inequality  statistic  is  simply  the  income  share  of  the  top  20%.  The  underlying
data  can  and  have  been  criticized.  Indeed,  some  have  argued  that  the  data  is
much  too  fragile  to  resolve  the  debate.  But  whatever  your  position  on  the
issue  of  data  quality,  two  morals  leap  out  from  Figure  1.  First,  the  more
robust  portion  of  the  Kuznets  Curve  lies  to  the  right:  income  inequality  falls
-11-create  a  path  dependent  egalitarian  regime  throughout  the  East  Asian
industrial  revolution.
It's  hard  to  say  much  more  about  Figure  1.  The  literature  doesn't  tell  us
an  awful  lot  about  why  a  Kuznets  Curve  should  appear  in  the  data  in  the  first
place.  And  the  data  doesn't  tell  us  anything  about  the  dynamic  which  produces
the  Kuznets  Curve  in  such  cross-section  data,  nor  why  some  countries  are
likely  to  depart  from  the  Curve.  It  turns  out  that  history  helps  out  on  both
counts.
Were  Today's  Industrialized  Countries  Always  Eualitarian?
Figure  1  documents  that  the  industrialized  countries  of  today  are  far
more  egalitarian  than  most  NICs  of  today.  lere  they  always  so  egalitarian?
They  were  not.  In  fact,  inequality  in  Europe  and  America  was  at  its  zenith  on
the  eve  of  World  War  I,  and  the  extent  of  that  inequality  was  very  similar  to
the  most  inegalitarian  NICs  of  today,  like  Brazil.  It  is  difficult  today  to
find  any  developing  country  wbere  the  top  5%  receive  almost  50%  of  the  income
or  where  the  top  1%  hold  70%  of  the  wealth.  Perhaps  only  such  "bad  Latins"  as
contemporary  Peru,  Panama,  and  Brazil  can  claim  that  dubious  distinction
today,  but  Lhey  also  describe  Britain  in  the  late  19th  century.  To  illustrate
the  point,  Figure  2  plots  two  contemporary  NICs,  Korea  --  a  "virtuous  Asian"
with  a fairly  egalitarian  distribution,  and  Brazil  .--  a "bad  Latin"  with  a
very  inegalitarian  distribution.  Four  NICs  around  World  War  I  --  the  United
Kingdom  (1913),  Prussia  (1913),  Denmark  (1908),  and  the  Netherlands  (1919)  --
all  tend  to  fall  in  between  these  bounds,  but  they  look  much  more  like  Brazil
in  the  upper  ranges  in  the  size  distribution.  In  short,  today's  industrialized
countries  had  inequality  levels  on  the  eve  of  World  War  I  similar  to  the  most
inegalitarian  of  today's  NICs.
-13-The  Downside  of the  Kuznets  Curve  and  20th  Century  Ineaualitv  Histories
Europe  and  America  were  not  always  so egalitarian,  it seems.  So,  when  did
the  egalitarian  leveling  take  place?  We have far  better  evidence  to answer
that  question  today  than  Kuznets  had  in 1955.
What  Arthur  Burns  saw  in  America  as  a "revolutionary  leveling"  after  1929
apparently  was  shared  by most  of Europe,  whose  experience  is  documented  in
Figure  3.  What is so striking  about  Figure  3  is the  extraordinary  similarity
in  each  national  downswing  of the  Kuznets  Curve  across  the  20th  century.  the
one possible  exception  is  Germany  in the  interwar  decades,  but  still  the
conformity  is striking.  Nor is the  historical  pattern  in  Figure  3 unique.  When
these  20th  century  time  series  are  pooled  with  the  contemporary  cross-section
in Figure  1, neither  the  levels  nor the  trends  show  sigificantly  different
patterns  than  those  already  summarized  in  Figure  1.  Thus,  20th  century  history
agrees  with  the  international  cross-sections  and  with  Kuznets'  original
conjecture:  there  is  a clear  trend  towards  equality  in the  later  stages  of
development.
A Word  About  Market  Forces  Versus  the  Fisc
The  inequality  we  have  been talking  about  thus  far  is pre-fisc,  that  is,
income  before  the  effects  of taxes,  transfers,  or government  purchases  of
goods  and  services.  There  are three  reasons  for  the  choice.  First,  and
certainly  most  pragmatic,  comparative  assessments  are  far  easier  to  make since
the  literature  is  dominated  by pre-fisc  estimates.  Second,  while  well-being  at
any  point  in time  is certainly  better  gauged  by post-fisc  income,  it is not  at
all  clear  that  inequality  trends  can  be explained  by changes  in the  "fisc".
-14-Indeed,  there  is  considerable  evidence,  recently  reviewed  by  Peter  Lindert
(1989),  that  fiscal  redistribution  explains  only  a  small  part  of  the  leveling
in  post-fisc  incomes  among  the  industrialized  countries  across  the  20th
century.  The  same  is  true  of  today's  international  cross-sections:  the
contrast  in  post-fisc  Gini  coefficients  between  egalitarian  Britain  and
inegalitarian  Brazil  owes  much  less  to  fiscal  redistribution  and  far  more  to
pre-fisc  inequalities  as  they  are  generated  in  the  marketplace.  Third,  the
economist  is  presented  with  a  greater  challenge  in  explaining  pre-fisc
inequality  since  it  is  the  complex  outcome  of  a  whole  range  of  macroeconomic
forces  which  influence  factor  rewards,  forces  which  the  economist  is  better
equipped  to  analyze.  Even  so,  a  case  can  be  made  that  the  same  market  forces
which  produced  the  pre-fisc  leveling  of  incomes  in  industrialized  countries
across  the  20th  century  also  produced  a  more  activist  government  fiscal
intervention,  serving  only  to  reinforce  the  egalitarian  trends  set  in  motion
by  market  forces.  We  shall  return  to  this  theme  in  Section  IV  where  we  discuss
changing  attitudes  toward  poverty,  but  the  key  moral  here  is  that  pre-fisc
factor  market  forces  have  been  at  the  heart  of  20th  century  egalitarian  trends
among  the  industrialized  countries.  What  was  true  of  the  20th  century  was  even
more  true  of  19th  century  trends  in  inequality  and  poverty.  To  understand
both,  we  need  to  understand  those  pre-fisc  factor  market  forces.
The  Upswina  of  the  Kuznets  Curve  and  19th  Century  Inequality  Histories
It  appears  that  we  can  document  a  20th  century  egalitarian  leveling  for  a
large  number  of  currently  industrialized  countries.  Did  they  also  undergo
a  rise  in  inequality  when  industrializing  in  the  19th  century?  Here  the
evidence  is  thinner,  but  at  least  we  have  detailed  evidence  on  two  countries
that  matter,  Britain  in  the  Old  World,  and  America  in  the  New  World.  Let's
-15-start  with  the  Britain  and  the  First  Industrial  Revolution.
While  the  evidence  is  still  being  hotly  debated,  what  we  do  have  suggests
that  British  capitalism  did  breed  inequality,  and  the  inequality  drift  seems
to  have  been  a  product  of  the  forces  associated  witb  the  industrial
revolution.  The  rise  in  inequality  can  be  dated  from  around  1760,  and  it  was
manifested  throughout  the  full  income  distribution:  the  income  sbares  at  the
top  rose,  the  shares  at  the  bottom  fell,  real  wages  of  the  unskilled  were
relatively  stable,  the  numbers  in  poverty  were  slow  to  fall,  the  premium  on
skills  inc^eased,  and  the  earnings  distribution  widened.  British  inequality
seems  to  have  reached  a  peak  somewhere  around  the  1860s  or  shortly  thereafter.
While  not  spectacular,  the  egalitarian  leveling  up  to  World  War  I  was
universal:  as  Figure  3  suggests,  the  income  shares  at  the  top  fell;  in
addition,  the  shares  at  the  bottom  rose,  the  relative  pay  of  the  unskilled
improved,  the  numbers  in  poverty  fell  sharply,  the  premium  on  skills  declined,
and  the  earnings  distribution  narrowed.  A  sample  of  the  data  wbich  supports
this  interpretation  can  be  found  in  Table  1.
Before  leaving  this  evidence,  one  important  finding  must  be  stressed.
Most  of  the  changes  in  British  (and  American,  as  we  shall  see)  inequality
across  the  19th  century  were  driven  by  changes  in  factor  rewards  --  the  wages
of  skilled  labor  relative  to  the  wages  of  unskilled  labor,  rents  on  land
relative  to  the  wages  of  unskilled  labor,  the  returns  to  capital  relative  to
the  wages  of  unskilled  labor  --  and  mueb  less  by  changes  in  the  distribution
of  factor  ownership.  Changes  in  earnings  inequality  are  explained  primarily  by
changes  in  the  structure  of  pay  rather  than  by  employment  shifts  from
occupations  with  low  skill  content  to  those  with  high.  While  skills  may  well
have  become  less  equally  distributed  in  the  early  19th  century,  it  was  the
inflation  in  the  premium  on  those  skills,  a  relative  scarcity  of  those  skills,
and  a  relative  glut  of  unskilled  labor  that  did  most  of  the  work  in  augmenting
-16-earnings  inequality  and  slowing  down  the  rate  of  poverty  eradicatioi  before
the  1860s.  Similarly,  the  increase  in  the  top  5  percent's  share  in  national
income  across  the  late  18th  and  early  19th  centuries  had  little  to  do  with
increased  concentration  of  landed  wealth  --  although  such  increases  may  well
have  taken  place  --  but  rather  with  the  behavior  of  rents  themselves.  Changes
in  the  distribution  of  wealth  induced  by  accumulation  served  to  reinforce  the
influence  of  changes  in  factor  rewards  on  the  distribution  of  income,  but  it
was  initial  changes  in  factor  rewards  that  seemed  to  matter  in  setting  the
Kuznets  Curve  in  motion.  This  turns  out  to  be  an  important  moral  to  remember
when  we  start  to  seach  for  explanations  of  historical  experience  rith  both
inequality  and  poverty.
So  mucb  for  the  Old  Vorld.  What  about  the  New?  Did  America  avoid  the
rising  inquality  which  appears  to  have  beset  Britain?  Apparently  not.  Income
and  wealth  inequality  rose  sharply  with  the  onset  of  modern  economic  growth
early  in  the  19th  century.  Egalitarian  trends  only  appear  with  the  advent  of
mature  capitalist  development  in  the  20th  century.  In  the  interim,  America
generated  seven  decades  of  pronounced  inequality  not  unlike  that  experienced
by  Britain,  or,  as  we  have  seen,  by  contemporary  Brazil.  Thus,  in  spite  of
abundant  land,  alleged  equality  of  opportunity,  democratic  institutions,  and  a
19th  century  reputation  as  an  ideal  poor  man's  country,  America  did  not  avoid
the  economic  inequality  commonly  believed  by  some  to  be  associated  with
capitalist  development.
Table  2  offers  a  sample  of  the  kind  of  evidence  which  supports  this
conclusion,  where  benchmark  estimates  of  wealth  concentration  are  summarized
over  the  past  two  centuries.  Other  evidence  on  4ncome  and  earnings  reinforces
those  trends  --  like  the  share  of  income  received  by  the  unskilled  and  the
rate  of  poverty  reduction,  the  latter  to  be  discussed  in  Section  IV.
In  short,  there  seems  to  be  sufficient  evidance  to  at  least  tentatively
-17-confirm  Kuznets'  hypothesis  for  Britain  and  America.  So,  why  did  these  two
countries  undergo  sharply  rising  inequality  during  their  industrial
revolutions  while  others  did  not,  and  why  did  all  of  them  undergo  a  leveling
in  late  stages  of  development?  And  what  do  the  answers  tell  us  about  the
impact  of  industrial  revolutions  on  the  poor  and  on  the  ravb  of  escape  from
poverty?
Theorizino  about  the  Kuznets  Curve:  Focus  on  Factor  Markets
Can  inequality  trends  be  explained  witbout  reference  to  changes  in  the
real  wage  of  the  unskilled  relative  to  other  factor  returns?  Were  this
possible,  then  the  nasty  complexity  of  modeling  the  entire  macroeconomic
structure  could  be  avoided.  Unfortunately,  most  inequality  movements  appear  to
stem  from  cLanges  in  the  relative  rates  of  factor  returns,  so  the
macromodeling  cannot  be  finessed.  Classical  economists  knew  this  well  enough
so  that  their  dynamic  models  of  growth  and  distribution  focused  on  factor
incomes  accruing  to  labor,  land,  and  capital.  Modern  human  capital  theory
implies  the  same,  with  focus  on  the  structure  of  pay  by  skill.
Kuznets  himself  wondered  if  his  Curve  might  not  be  the  result  of  shifts
in  employment  alone,  and  Sherman  Robinson  (1976)  gave  the  idea  some  empirical
plausibility.  Stripped  to  its  essentials,  the  argument  goes  something  like
this.  Imagine  a  traditional  society  characterized  by  perfect  equality,  with
everyone  earning  5  pesos  in  agriculture,  close  to  subsistence,  and  below  some
poverty  line.  Let  some  modernizing  influence  introduce  an  urban  job  paid  at  10
pesos,  which  is  first  enjoyed  by  just  one  lucky  individual  who  escapes  rural
poverty.  These  jobs  then  diffuse  tbrough  society  until  everyone  earns  the  10
pesos.  Any  conventional  inequality  measure  will  rise  from  the  initial  perfect
equality  and  then  return  to  it  later,  tracing  out  the  Kuznets  Curve;  any
-18-measure  of poverty  incidence  will fall  --  first  at slow  rates,  then
accelerating  to fast  rates,  and finally  settling  down  again  to  slow  rates;  and
any  measure  of the  living  standards  of the  poor  will  exhibit  stability
throughout.
While  simple  and  elegant,  there  are  limits  to any  inequality  explanation
which  relies  solely  on this  kind  of diflusion  process.  It is  not  true  that
inequality  histories  are  driven  solely  or even  primarily  by such  forces.  Pay
advantages  themselves  tend  first  to  rise  and  then  to fall.  Indeed,  over  half
the  observed  rise in  aggreu.zte  earnings  inequality  in 19th  century  Britain
stemmed  from  movements  in  these  pay  ratios  by skill,  including  the  earnings
gap  between  farm  and  city.
The  pattern  of rising  and  falling  pay  ratios  is sufficiently  widespread,
and  so closely  parallels  overall  inequality  trends,  that  it suggests  that  any
theory  of the  Kuznets  Curve  must explain  why the  real  wage  of the  unskilled
lags  behind,  and  thus  why  the  rate  of escape  from  poverty  can  be so slow,
during  early  stages  of industrialization,  and  why  the  real  wage  catches  up in
later  stages,  and  tbus  why  the  rate  of poverty  eradication  accelerates.
What about  the  dist  ibution  of non-human  wealth?  In principle,  one  might
imagine  that  changes  in  he distribution  of wealth  might  be an independent
determinant  of changes  in income  inequality.  Although  changes  in  wealth
distribution  associated  with slave  emancipation,  land  reform,  civil  war,  and
nationalization  may  be loosely  associated  with  the  stresses  of  modern  economic
growth,  and  while  they  may  help  account  for  idiosyncratic  experience  in some
national  histories,  they  cannot  offer  any  coberent  explanation  of the  Kuznets
Curve.  It  seems  more  appropriate  to view  long  run  trends  in the  distribution
of wealth  either  as a result  of  previous  changes  in the  distribution  of income
or as  a simultaneous  outcome,  since  those  forces  driving  returns  to assets
surely  also  govern  the  aggregate  value  and  distribution  of wealth.
-19-We are led,  then,  back  to factor  markets,  and to  labor  markets  in
particular.  So it is that  economic  historians  and  development  economists  have
pondered  at length  how labor  markets  work  in economies  shocked  by the
disequilibrium  of Industrial  Revolutions  and  Demographic  Transitions.  And  so
it is that  Jan  Tinbergen  (1975)  has  focused  on a model  of labor  markets  to
account  for  the  20th  century  leveling  of income  and  earnings  in the
industrialized  economies.  What  follows  is in that  tradition.  So,  how  might
factor  demand  and  supply  forces  have  operated  in the  past  to produce
inequality  on the  upswing  of the  Kuznets  Curve  and  to  make poverty  such  a
stubborn  problem?  when  and  where  have  those  forces  been  modified,  and  have
they  created  industrialization  histories  of less  inequality  and  more  dramatic
reductions  in  poverty?
Labor  Savina  Technological  Chanae
A potentially  powerful  factor-demand  force  behind  inequality  and  poverty
experience  is  the  degree  to  which  technological  progress  tends  to economize  on
some  factors  of production  while  favoring  the  use  of others.  A bias  toward
unskilled-labor  saving  can  widen  income  gaps  by worsening  job  prospects  and
wages  for  the  unskilled  while  bidding  up the  returns  to skills,  capital,  and
perhaps  even  land.  This  idea  is  hardly  novel,  but  the  evidence  on long-run,
systematic  movements  in  the  factor  demand  bias  needs  to be established,  as
well  as its  correlation  with the  Kuznets  Curve.  We do know  that  American
growth  in the  19th  century  was  heavily  unskilled-labor  saving,  and  the  same
seems  to  have  been true  of Britain  prior  to 1860.  Most would  argue  that  the
same  has  been  true  of the  Third  World  since  1950.  But is there  any  evidence
suggesting  that  these  high  rates  of unskilled-labor  saving  abate  as  nations
approach  maturity?  Third  World  experience  is,  of course,  too  short  to offer
-20-any  guidance,  but  Britain's  experience  with  productivity  slowdown  around  the
turn  of the  century  appears  to  be consistent  with  sharp  retardation,  if  not
reversal,  in the  rate  of unskilled-labor  saving.  But  America  offers  the  most
comprehensive  evidence  by far.  For the  economy  as a whole,  each  of several
studies  has found  a strong  aggregate  labor-saving  bias from  ah%out  the  start  of
this  century  to 1929,  followed  by a switch  to  either  neutrality  or a
labor-using  bias  up to  the  Korean  War.  None  of these  studies  actually
distinguished  between  unskilled  and skilled  labor,  but  it may  be surmized  that
any  era  of labor  saving  was  likely  to have  been  especially  unskilled-labor
saving.  Thus,  the  downswing  of the  Kuznets  Curve  which  starts  in the  late  19th
century  in  Britain  and  after  1929  in America  may  have  been  due to  a %witch  in
the  bias  of aggregate  technological  progress  from  unskilled  labor  saving  which
preceded  those  dates.
It is  important  at this  point  to  pause  and remind  ourselves  what  we mean
by aggregate  labor  saving.  Aggregate  labor  saving  can  appear  in  the  historical
data  for  any  of the  following  three  reasons:  (i)  differences  in the  rate  of
technological  advance  between  industries  of different  labor  intensities;  (ii)
shifts  in industrial  output  mix  away  from  labor-intensive  sectors  induced  by
shifts  in product  demand  or factor  supply  forces;  and (iii)  the  introduction
of labor-saving  technologies  within  industries.  The last  of these  --  labor
saving  at the  industry  level  --  was  a favorite  econometric  exercise  a decade
or two  ago,  but  nothing  in that  literature  establishes  any  historical  pattern,
Kuznetsian  or othervise.  The  first  and  second  sources  appear  to  be more
promising.
It is certainly  true  that  one of the  stylized  facts  of development  is the
shift  in  output  and  employment  mix as economies  undergo  the  transition  from  an
agrarian  base  to advanced  industrialization.  Thus,  the  rate  at which
agriculture  declines  as a share  of aggregate  output  or employment  begins
-21-slowly,  then  quickens,  reaching  a peak  as the  Industrial  Revolution  hits full
stride,  and  then  drops  off  as the  transformation  is completed  at late  stages
of development.  To the  extent  that  agriculture  is relatively  unskilled-labor
intensive,  high and  rising  aggregate  unskilled-labor  saving  early  in  the
Industrial  Revolution  should  be followed  by a fall  in the  rate  of aggregate
unskilled-labor  saving  late  in the  development  process.  If  these  derived  labor
demand  forces  are  strong  enough,  the  Ruznets  Curve  is assured.
However,  unbalanced  output  growth  such  as this  cannot  be viewed  as an
exogenous  force  driving  inequality  if  endogenous  domestic  demand  forces  --
like  Engel  Effects  --  account  for  it.  How  much  of the  spectacular  shift  in
output  mix in the  Tbird  World  today  or in  Britain  and  America  in the  last
century  can  be explained  by trade  and  domestic  policies  of "urban  bias"  wbich
which  favor  capital/skill-intensive  activities,  and  how  much  by favorable
world  market  conditions  in those  sectors?  How  much  of the  shift  can  be
explained  by the  rapid  rate  of technological  progress  outside  of unskilled
labor  intensive  agriculture  or more unskilled  labor  intensive  services  --  what
we are  calling  unbalanced  productivity  advance?  The key  point  here is simply
that  the  sectoral  shift  itself  is not  an independent  influebce  on inequality
unless  it can  be shown  that  it comes  from  sueb  exogenous  forces.  Furthermore,
we then  have  to sbow  that  these  exogenous  forces  are themselves  correlated
with  the  Kuznets  Curve.  One  of these  witb  some  promise  is the  urban  bias,  a
topic  of Section  IV.  A second  is unbalanced  productivity  advance,  a central
force  driving  unskilled  labor  saving  and  thus  experience  with  inequality  and
poverty.
An extensive  literature  has sketched  the  sectoral  patterns  of total
factor  productivity  growtb  over  the  last  150  years  in America.  The  secular
movements  do indeed  trace  out  a 19th  century  drift  away  from  labor-using
sectors,  largely  because  productivity  advance  was rapid  in capital  and
-22-skill-intensive  manufacturing  and  transportation,  while  large  and
labor-intensive  agriculture  lagged  far  behind.  Early  in  this  century  the  same
labor-saving  imbalance  between  sectors  continued  up  to  World  War  I  and  across
the  1920s.  Between  1929  and  1953,  the  sectoral  pattern  was  much  more  balanced,
with  agriculture  in  particular  catching  up  with  the  rest  of  the  economy.  To
summarize,  the  rise  and  fall  in  the  rate  of  labor  saving  associated  with
unbalanced  productivity  advance  seems  to  correlate  well  with  the  American
Kuznets  Curve.
A  similar  pattern  seems  to  have  characterized  British  experience.  Between
1780  and  1860,  technological  progress  was  very  unbalanced  in  favor  of  the
capital/skills-intensive  sectors,  shifting  factor  demand  away  from  unskilled
labor.  After  1860,  the  sectoral  pattern  of  Britisb  productivity  advance  was
far  more  balanced  in  its  factor-demand  effects.  Like  20th  century  America,
late  l9th  century  Britain's  farm  sector  switched  from  a  large,  unskilled
labor-intensive  activity  with  relatively  slow  productivity  advance  to  a  small
sector  with  average  capital  intensity  and  productivity  performance.  And  once
again,  the  timing  of  the  switch  to  more  balanced  productivity  advance
coincided  with  a  historic  peak  in  the  Kuznets  Curve.
"Classic"  patterns  of  unbalanced  productivity  advance  like  those  revealed
by  American  and  British  history  hold  promise  in  helping  account  for  the
Kuznets  Curve  when  it  appears.  As  long  as  product  demands  are  elastic  --  as  in
the  open  economy  case,  then  rapid  productivity  advance  off  the  farm  will  pull
resources  from  agricluture.  Since  traditional  agriculture  uses  unskilled  labor
in  large  doses  and  since  modern  urban  activities  use  unskilled  labor  in
smaller  doses,  the  demand  for  unskilled  labor  softens  relative  to  capital  and
skills,  unskilled  wages  lag  behind,  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution
suffers,  and  history  traces  out  the  upswing  of  the  Kuznets  Curve.  American  and
British  history  also  suggest  that  evidence  of  the  Kuzuets  Curve  is  likely  to
-23-be  most striking  for  those  countries  whose  technological  history  has  been most
unbalanced,  and  for  whom  agriculture  has  lagged  most behind,  ceteris  paribus.
The  Kuznets  Curve  is  most  likely  to  be absent  in those  countries  who  have  been
most  successful  iii  avoiding  unbalanced  productivity  advance.  One such  example
seems  to be Japan.  There  is no clear  drift  in the  rate  of labor-saving  implied
by the  intersectoral  pattern  of Japanese  productivity  advance  from  the  1880s
to the  1930s. Japan  also  seems  to have  avoided  the  Kuznets  Curve  over  the
past  century.
Immigration,  Demographic  Transitions,  and  Labor  Supplies
It  has become  commonplace  in the  historical  literature  to associate  the
demographic  transition  with  labor  surplus,  poverty,  and  inequality.  The
argument  develops  along  the  following  lines:  Moder.  economic  growth  begins  on
a  traditional  agrarian  base  characterized  by elastic  labor  supplies,  better
known  as surplus  unskilled  labor.  Accelerating  rates  of capital  accumulation
thus  fail  to  generate  rising  wages  among  the  unskilled  until  the  surplus  labor
pool is  exhausted.  This  turning  point  can  be postponed  for  some  time  if either
the  forces  of demographic  transition  or foreign  immigration  continually
replenish  the  initial  pool.  Under  such  conditions  stable  real  wages  among  the
unskilled  poor  could  coincide  with  rising  per  capita  incomes,  tending  to
create  more  inequality.
Increased  fertility  and  immigration  associated  with the  industrial
revolution  should  foster  income  inequality  in two  ways.  First,  it  gluts  labor
markets  with  young  and  unskilled  new  entrants,  creating  massive  changes  in the
age  distribution  of the  population  and  the  labor  force. Such  changes  in the
age  distribution  can  create  inequality  even  if factor  prices  and the  structure
of incomes  are  unaffected,  as Simon  Kuznets  (1976),  Samuel  Morley  (1981),  and
-24-others  have noted.  That is,  there  will  be more  at the  bottom  of the
distribution  than  before.  Second,  the  glut  lowers  the  relative  wage  of
unskilled  poor,  while  raising  the  returns  to skills  and  conventional  capital,
thus  fostering  inequality.  It also  follows  that  those  countries  which  have
been  beset  with external  immigrations  during  their  industrial  revolutions  are
more likely  to  exhibit  rising  inequality  (like  the  New  World).  Similarly,
those  countries  which  underwent  significant  external  emigration  during  their
industrial  revolutions  are  more  likely  to  have avoided  rising  inequality  (like
the  Old  World).  In  addition,  those  countries  which  underwent  more  dramatic
demographic  transitions  are  far  more likely  to trace  out  unambiguous  Kuzuets
Curves  in their  historical  data  than  those  who  did  not (like  France  and
Japan).
Human  Capital  Accumulation  and  Skills  Deepenina
As early  as 1848,  John  Stuart  Mill predicted  that  an  acceleration  in
skills  acquistion  would  eventually  erase  the  skills  scarcity  and  resulting
earnings  inequality  generated  by the  industrial  revolution.  The  poor  would
gain  in two  ways:  those  who  got  the  skills  would  move to  better  jobs,  and
those  %ho didn't  would  find  their  unskilled  services  scarcer  and  thus  earning
higher  wages.  That  proposition  has remained  untested  for  more than  a century,
dnd  it is clearly  relevant  to  understanding  the  Kuznets  Curve.  After  all,  it
wasn't  until  the  1960s  that  Gary  Becker  (1962;  1964)  and  Theodore  Schultz
(1961;  1963)  started  us quantifying  human  capital  formation.  Since  then,  there
has  been  a veritable  flood  of empirical  work documenting  labor  force  quality
trends,  including  some  recent  estimates  for  both 19th  century  America  and
Britain.
These  estimates  suggest  that  the  rate  of skills  deepening  (that  is,  the
-25-rise  in skills  per  member  of the  labor  force)  correlates  well  with  skills
scarcity,  earnings  inequality,  and  income  inequality.  The  rate  of skills
deepening  was exceedingly  low  in  Britain  during  her  early  phase  of rising  wage
inequality;  the  pace  quickened  around  mid-century,  about  a  decade  after  Hills'
observation;  and  the  rate  of skills  deepening  reached  irlressive  levels  in the
era  following  the  educational  reforms  of the  1870s,  coinciding  with  the  first
drop  down  Britain's  Kuznets  Curve.  The  American  correlation  looks  similar,
though  the  turning  points  come later,  well into  the  20th  century,  both  for  the
rate  of skills  deepening  and  for  the  leveling  of incomes.  The  historical
evidence  from  these  two  countries  at least  suggests  a slow  equilbrating
process,  whereby  one  generation's  skilled-wage  gap  promotes  the  next
generation's  faster  accumulation  of skills.  The institutional  and  economic
arrangements  which  make the  human  capital  accumulation  response  rapid  in some
countries  (like  East  Asia)  and slower  in  others  (like  Latin  America)  clearly
will  play  a role  in  determining  whetber  a Kuznets  Curve  will be more
pronounced  in some  countries  compared  with  others.
What  About  CaDital  Accumulation?
So  far,  we haven't  said  a  word about  capital  accumulation.  The  reason
is that  the  influence  is  more  complex,  although  we used to think  it  was
straightfoward.  Back  in simpler  days  when  we thought  in terms  of capital  and
labor  only,  and  given  that  the  elasticity  of substitution  between  the  two  was
less  than  one,  then it  followed  that  accumulation  raised  labor's  share  and
diminished  inequality.  Reality  is  more  complex,  especially  when  we think  in
terms  of three  factors  --  labor,  skills,  and  capital,  and  when  we also  worry
about  the  source  of capital  accumulation.
If our  interest  were  confined  to the  earnings  distribution  and  the
-26-skilled  wage  ratio,  it  would  be  a  simple  matter  to  predict  the  effects  of
capital  accumulation.  History  tells  us  that  capital  tends  to  be  complementary
with  skills  and  a substitute  for  unskilled  labor,  so  a  rise  in  the  capital
stock  should  augment  the  skilled-wage  ratio  and  earnings  inequality.
Furthermore,  an  increase  in  the  capital  stock  implies  an  increase  in  the
relative  size  of  the  capital  goods  sector,  the  more  so  are  capital  goods
produced  at  home.  History  tells  us  that  the  capital  goods  sector  tends  to  use
skilled  labor  intensively,  so  the  demand  for  skills  is  driven  up  and  we  have
another  force  tending  to  raise  the  skilled-wage  ratio  and  earnings  inequality.
The  impact  of  capital  accumulation  on  inequality  becomes  more  difficult
to  identify  when  our  interest  shifts  from  earnings  inequality  to  income
inequality.  Suppose  an  outward  shift  in  the  supply  of  savings  --  due  to  a rise
in  domestic  thrift  or  to  an  inflow  of  foreign  investment  --  creates  capital
deepening.  The  augmented  supply  of  capital  will  raise  the  skilled-wage  ratio
and  earnings  inequality  for  the  reasons  already  offered,  but  it  is  also  likely
to  lower  the  return  to  capital.  Since  capital's  return  is  diminished  while
earnings  inequality  is  augmented,  the  impact  on  overall  income  inequality  is
ambiguous.  Suppose  instead  that  the  source  of  the  capital  deepening  is  an
improvement  in  capital  goods  supply,  driven  by  unbalanced  productivity
improvements  favoring  the  capital  goods  sector,  and  revealed  by  a  decline  in
the  relative  price  of  capital  goods.  In  this  case,  income  inequality  is
clearly  increased.  Not  only  should  wage  stretching  and  increased  earnings
inequality  take  place,  but  the  rate  of  return  to  capital  should  also  rise  as
should  capital's  share.  Finally,  suppose  it  is  some world  price  shock  or  some
technological  event  which  raises  the  relative  demand  for  capital.  Once  again,
income  inequality  is  assured.
Obviously,  the  impact  of  capital  accumulation  on  inequality  is  complex,
and  it  may  vary  from  country  to  country.  If  it  is  driven  by  a  secular  boom  in
-27-investment  demand or  by  a  exogenous  decline  ia  the  relative  price  of
investment  goods,  inequality  is  assured.  If  instead  it  is  driven  by  an
exogenous  rise  in  domestic  savings  or  foreign  capital  inflows,  it  isn't
assured.  This  distinction  may  offer  yet  another  reason  why  some  countries
conform  to  the  Kuznets  Curve  while  others  don't.
What  Explains  the  Kuznets  Curve?  Lessons  from  History
So,  we  have  three  or  four  plausible  forces  that  might  account  for  the
presence  (or  the  absence)  of  the  Kuznets  Curve.  To  repeat:  labor  saving
technological  change  --  a  force  that  Marx  favored;  labor  supply  --  a  force
which  Malthus  favored;  human  capital  accumulation  --  a  force  which  Mill
favored;  and  conventional  capital  accumulation  --  although  this  can  hardly  be
viewed  as  an  independent  force  if  it  is  being  driven  by  the  first  two.
Plaudibility  is  one  thing,  however.  Fact  is  another.  How  are  we  to
discriminate  between  these  plausible  explanations?  History  has  a  nasty  way  of
generating  multicollinearity:  industrial  revolutions  are  associated  with
increased  labor  saving,  quickening  rates  of  labor  force  growth,  rising
accumulation  rates,  and  anti-agrarian  policies.  How  do  you  sort  one  out  from
the  other?
Our  view  of  inequality  history,  particularly  in  Britain  and  America,
leads  us  to  concentrate  on  fundamental  trends  in  factor  demands  and  supplies
associated  with  the  industrial  revolution.  To  quantify  these  influences,
computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models  have  been  used.  When  these  CGEs
are  applied  to  American  and  British  inequality  history,  what  do  we  find?
The  surge  in  American  inequality  before  the  Civil  War  seems  to  have  been
due  primarily  to  the  extraordinary  rates  of  capital  accumulation  obtained
during  those  decades,  rates  that  were  generated  by  a  secular  boom  in
-28-investment  demand  itself  pushed  by  rapid  rates  of  labor  saving  technological
advance.  Rapid  accumulation  favored  skilled  workers  towards  the  middle  of  the
distribution  and  capitalists  towards  the  top  of  the  distribution  in  two  ways.
First,  a  greater  proportion  of  unskilled  labor  (a  substitute  for  capital)  than
skilled  labor  (a  complement  to  capital)  was  replaced  by  mechanization.  Second,
accumulation  helped  raise  income  per  capita,  and  this  rise,  through  Engel's
Law,  caused  agriculture  to  contract  as  a  share  in  national  income,  a  process
that  released  relatively  large  doses  of  unskilled  labor.  Unbalanced
technological  progress  centered  on  manufacturing  and  transport  favored  the
expansion  of  capital  and  skill  intensive  sectors,  contributing  to  the  rise  in
inequality  on  two  counts:  directly  by  favoring  the  modern  sectors  where
unskilled  labor  was  used  the  least,  and  indirectly  by  inducing  an  accumulation
response  with  the  results  alread  described.
After  the  Civil  War  and  as  the  late  19th  century  progressed,  capital
accumulation  became  a  little  less  rapid,  and  productivity  growth  a  bit  less
unbalanced.  These  changes  explain  about  half  of  the  observed  shift  from
sharply  rising  inequality  on  the  upswing  of  the  Kuznets  Curve,  to  relative
stability  in  those  inequality  trends  along  the  Kuznets  Curve's  high  American
plateau.  Demographic  events  explain  much  of  the  remainder.  Skills  per  man
hour  appear  to  have  grown  significantly  in  the  late  19th  century  after  having
remained  stable  for  much  of  the  antebellum  period  --  in  part  due  to  the
earlier  rise  in  foreign  immigration  rates.  The  apparent  cause  of  this
acceleration  in  skills-deepening  and  skills-widening  was  the  decline  in  the
share  of  the  labor  force  consisting  of  new,  unskilled  immigrants.  The
resulting  rise  in  the  rate  of  skills-deepening  helped  prevent  a  continuation
of  the  surge  in  earnings  and  income  inequality  started  earlier  in  the  century.
The  first  decade  of  the  20th  century  brought  a  resumption  of  wage
stretching,  and  rising  earnings  and  income  inequality.  This  time  the
-29-explanation  clearly  rested  on  a  resumption  of  more  unbalanced  rates  of
technological  progress.  Across  the  1910s  and  1920s,  American  inequality  first
compressed  during  the  war  and  then  bounced  right  back  in  the  immediate  postwar
period,  leaving  no  net  cbange.  If  the  only  kind  of  growtb  from  1909  to  1929
had  been  growth  in  factor  supplies,  the  era  of  income  leveling  would  have  been
ushered  in  two  decades  earlier.  This  follows  since  immigration  and  fertility
were  making  much  smaller  contributions  to  labor  force  growth,  especially
during  World  War  I  and  after  the  immigratioe  restrictions  took  effect  in  the
mid-1920s.  The  slower  labor  force  growth  and  the  faster  rate  of
skills-deepening  served  to  compress  the  pay  structure  and  level  earnings
distributions.  But  in  fact  there  was  no  net  compression  in  the  pay  structure.
Why?  Because  technological  progress  was  again  very  unbalanced,  and  it  centered
on  sectors  which  used  a  lot  of  skills,  some  capital,  but  little  unskilled
labor.
When  the  downswing  of  the  American  Kuznets  Curve  finally  arrived
following  1929,  it  was  the  result  of  the  coincidence  of  technological  and
demographic  forces.  Total  factor  productivity  growth  was  more  evenly  balanced
across  sectors  than  in  any  other  era  since  1840,  accelerating  in  agriculture
and  some  services.  This  change  accounted  for  about  half  of  the  leveling
between  1929  and  the  Korean  War.  Most  of  the  remainder  is  explained  by
demographic  forces:  by  the  great  fertility  decline  and  by  shutting  out
immigrants  from  the  Old  World.  The  rise  in  government  expenditures  seems  to
have  made  only  a  very  modest  contribution.
It  now  appears  that  America  and  Britain  both  experienced  the  Kuznets
Curve  of  first  rising,  then  falling,  inequality.  Nonetheless,  the  timing  of
the  Kuznets  Curve  differed.  As  we  have  seen,  British  inequality  seems  to  have
peaked  in  the  middle  of  the  19th  century  while  American  inequality  remained  at
a  plateau  from  the  Civil  War  to  the  1920s  before  starting  its  downswing.  Why
-30-does  the  leveling  start  a  half-century  sooner  in  Britain?  In  any  case,  were
the  forces  driving  the  British  Kuznets  Curve  across  the  19th  century
quantitatively  similar  to  those  which  we  have  already  documented  for  America?
It  seems  so.
As  with  America,  changes  in  the  rate  of  unbalanced  productivity  advance
and  changes  in  the  rate  of  skills  deepening  are  two  critical  forces  driving
the  British  Kuznets  Curve  across  the  19th  century.  The  pay  gaps  and  earnings
inequality  set  in  motion  by  unbalanced  productivity  advance  --  favoring
relatively  rapid  expansion  in  the  derived  demand  for  skills,  served  to  offer
great  and  increasing  incentive  to  investment  in  human  capital  much  like  John
Stuart  Kill  alleged  in  1848.  However,  the  slow  and  inelastic  supply  response
in  skills  per  worker  --  explained  in  part  by  income  constraints  facing
the  poor  unskilled  and  in  part  by  the  modest  intervention  by  the  state,  both
of  which  limited  the  ability  of  the  poor  to  invest  in  human  capital  --  made  it
possible  for  inequality  to  persist  for  many  decades  before  the  demand-side
disequilibrium  began  to  be  rectified  in  the  late  19th  century  and  earnings
inequality  began  to  settle  down.
One  of  the  reasons  why  Britain  underwent  a  leveling  on  the  downside  of
the  Kuznets  Curve  before  America  did  appears  to  be  because  Britain  suffered  a
late  19th  century  and  early  20th  century  productivity  slowdown  while  America
did  not.  A second  explanation  can  be  found  on  the  factor-supply  side:  Britain
never  had  to  absorb  increasing  unskilled  labor  supplies  from  abroad  --
although  she  had  her  share  of  Irish  early  in  the  century  --  so  that  she  could
accelerate  the  rate  of  skills  deepening  earlier  than  could  America.
To  summarize,  no  unambiguous  theory  of  the  Kuznets  Curve  emerges  from
this  look  at  history.  After  all,  no  inevitable  law  of  economic  motion  has
emerged  from  history  either.  First,  the  evidence  which  documents  inequality
among  industrializing  nations  then  and  now  is  sufficiently  fragile  to  insure
-31-that  the  debate  started  by  Marx  and  Engels  early  in  the  last  century  will
continue  well  into  the  next.  Second,  there  is  more  than  one  patb  to
development.  Representing  the  Old  World  and  the  New,  Britain  and  America  both
seem  to  have  satisfied  the  economic  and  demographic  conditions  whicb  can
generate  a  Kuznets  Curve.  These  were:  a  rise  and  fall  in  labor  saving
technological  change,  the  source  of  which  was  a  rise  and  fall  in  what  we  have
called  unbalanced  productivity  advance  centered  on  gaps  between  industry  and
agriculture;  a  rise  and  fall  in  the  rate  of  labor  force  growth,  the  source  of
wbich  was  the  demographic  transition  and  foreign  immigration;  a  very  long  lag
in  the  rate  of  skills  or  human  capital  deepening;  and  a  rise  and  fall  in  the
rate  of  accumulation  induced  in  large  part  by  the  same  labor-saving
(capital-using)  forces.  Not  all  countries  satisfied  these  conditions:  Japan,
for  example,  seems  to  have  missed  most  of  the  first  three  and  thus  seems  to
have  missed  the  Kuznets  Curve  as  well.
What  about  the  Expenditure  Side?
As  Section  I  pointed  out,  while  the  incomes  of  the  poor  lagged  bebind  on
the  upswing  of  the  Xuznets  Curve  in  Britain  and  America,  they  also  suffered  on
the  expenditure  side  since  the  living  costs  they  faced  rose  sharply  in
relative  price.  That  is,  the  same  forces  that  caused  the  wages  of  the  poor  to
lag  behind  also  tended  to  raise  the  poor's  living  costs  --  industrialization
in  the  19th  century  cheapened  the  goods  that  the  poor  produced  relative  to  the
goods  that  the  poor  consumed.  Unbalanced  productivity  advance,  inelastic  land
supplies,  and  an  anti-poor  regime  of  state  intervention  were  the  critical
forces  that  generated  that  result.  The  relative  price  of  food  and  rents  are
crucial  to  the  story  since  both  loomed  so  large  in  the  budgets  of  the  poor,
especially  the  urban  poor.  Botb  increased  during  periods  of  rising  income
-32-inequality.  Technological  advance  was  fast  in  industry,  while  slow  in
agriculture  and  urban  housing,  thus  increasing  the  relative  price  of  the  two
wage  goods  most  important  to  the  poor.  These  technological  forces  were
reinforced  by  inelastic  land  supplies  which  were,  of  course,  more  important
inputs  to  agriculture  and  urban  housing.  To  make  matters  even  worse  for  the
poor,  anti-agriculture  domestic  price  policies  served  to  raise  the  cost  of
food  even  more,  while  inadequate  investment  in  city  social  overhead,
especially  in  poor  urban  districts,  served  to  lower  living  standards  of  the
poor  as  well.  These  policies  will  be  explored  at  length  in  Section  IV.
First,  let  us  confront  the  assertion  that  food  and  rents  were  the  key
wage  goods  of  the  poor  in  the  19th  century.  We  focus  throughout  on  the  urban
poor  since,  after  all,  they  were  increasing  in  is 1ortance  as  the  century
progressed.  Table  3  supplies  some  evidence  from  both  England  and  America.
Among  Nassachsetts  urban  poor  in  1875,  the  food  and  rent  share  combined  was
89.5%,  68.9%  for  food  and  20.6%  for  rent.  Similar  shares  were  typical  of
London's  poor  in  the  early  19th  century.  Finally,  the  city  of  Northampton
supplies  rent  shares  by  income  class  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century:  the
pattern  across  income  classes  is  very  steep,  falling  from  44%  among  the
extreme  poor  to  only  8%  among  the  richest.  Clearly,  food  and  rznfo  were  the
key  wage  goods  among  the  poor.
Second,  what  bappened  to  prices  of  these  key  wage  goods?  We  offer  three
pieces  of  evidence  to  confirm  the  view  that  the  relative  price  of  these  wage
goods  was  rising  during  the  19th  century.  Table  4  documents  the  ratio  of
living  costs  between  the  unskilled  poor  and  the  rich  in  America's  eastern
cities  over  the  first  two  decades  of  rapid  industrialization,  1820-1839.  The
ratio  rises  by  about  10%  over  the  two  decades,  driven  by  the  terms  of  trade
forces  outlined  above.  A strategic  wage  good,  food,  was  rising  in  relative
price  (Williamson,  1976).  This  rise  in  the  relative  cost  of  living  facing  the
-33-urban  poor  ir,  furthermore,  understated  since  it  excludes  rents.  We  have
better  evidence  for  Britain  in  that  regard.
The  relative  price  of  food  also  rose  during  the  First  Industrial
Revolution  across  the  Atlantic.  Table  5  shows  by  how  much  over  the  two  decades
shortly  after  the  French  Wars  and  prior  to  the  tariff  acts  of  the  1840s.  The
terms  of  trade  between  food  (accounting  for  63.8%  of  the  poor's  budgets)  and
textiles  (accounting  for  only  13%  of  the  poor's  budgets)  almost  tripled.
Furthermore,  Table  6  shows  that  urban  rents  facing  the  poor  also
increased  dramatically  in  relative  price  (accounting  for  between  23.2  to  44%
of  the  poor's  budgets),  around  2%  or  3%  per  year  between  1800  and  1840.  Real
rents  therefore  may  have  increased  by  as  much  as  30%  each  decade,  an  enormous
figure  which  serveJ  to  erode  the  urban  poor's  living  standards  from  7  to  13%
each  decade  (30%  times  .232  or .44).  And  this  is  probably  an  understatement
since  the  quality  of  their  housing  is  likely  to  have  declined  over  time  as
they  cut  back  demand  in  the  face  of  rising  price.
Thus,  the  poor  suffered  on  two  counts,  on  the  employment  and  the
expenditure  side.  Increasingly  expensive  food  and  housing  forced  them  to
economize  on  both,  lowering  nutrition  intake  and  crowding  them  in  to  slum
dwellings  where  they  were  exposed  to  greater  health  hazards.  The  result  was
far  higher  mortality  and  morbidity  rates  in  the  cities  (Table  7),  and  this  is
where  an  increasing  number  of  the  poor  were  located  as  the  industrial
revolution  wore  on.  The  cities  remained  that  way  throughout  Europe  and  America
until  late  in  the  century  when  the  state  began  to  allocate  more  social
overhead  to  the  expensive  task  of  cleaning  up  those  urban  environments.
What  about  the  Livina  Standards  of  the  Poor?
Rising  inequality  is  one  thing,  but  the  standard  of  living  of  the  poor  is
-34-another.  The  former  need  not  imply  no gains  in the  latter.  The  best
information  documenting  living  standards  of the  poor  during  19th  century
industrial  revolutions  comes  from  Britain,  and  it is summarized  in  Figure  4.
Four  occupational  groups  are  presented  there:  two  representing  the  poor  --
farm  laborers  and  the  urban  unskilled  (  "middle  group"),  one  representing  the
more skilled  urban  worker  ("artisans"),  and  one  representing  the  most skilled
and  literate  in urban  services  ("white  collar").  Up to 1819,  there  was almost
no increase  in the  living  standards  of the  poor.  Between  1819  and  1851,  living
standards  of the  poor  did  rise,  but they  rose  by less  than  skilled  workers,
and  farm  laborers  lagged  behind  most  as the  wage  gap  between  city  and
countryside  opened  up.  Furthermore,  we know  that  these  modest  real  wage  gains
among  the  poor  would  be even  more  modest  were  we able  to adjust  for  the
declining  quality  of life  associated  with  those  high-mortality  and
disamenity-rife  cities.
Having  established  British  and  American  experience  with inequality  and
living  standards  of the  poor  during  their  industrial  revolutions,  the
remainder  of this  essay  will  focus  on poverty.  How  did  the  share  in  poverty
behave  over time,  what  were  its  determinants,  and  who  were the  poor?
-35-III.  WHAT  ABOUT  POVERTY?
Trends  in  Poverty
What  can  we  say  about  the  extent  and  composition  of  poverty  in  the  19th
century  industrializing  countries?  Recent  studies  by  Irma  Adelman  and  Cynthia
Taft  Morris  (1978,  1988)  have  used  an  admirable  range  of  sources  to  make
comparisons  of  poverty  across  countries  in  the  19th  century.  Their  conclusions
are  pessimistic  as  to  the  effect  of  economic  development  on  the  lives  of  the
poor:
"...in  countrx4z  at low  levels  of  development  any  kind  of structural
change  such  as  industrialization  or  expanded  comercialization  tends  to
increase  poverty  among  the  poorest  members  of  the  population"  (1978,
p.256).
Much  of  the  evidence  behind  this  conclusion,  however,  is  qualitative  and
impressionistic.  There  are  dangers  in  using  such  evidence.  For  exasple,  an
increase  in  writing  about  the  poor  in  the  19th  century  need  not  reflect  an
increase  in  the  extent  of  poverty.  Upper  classes  may  have  been  made  more  aware
of  poverty  by  changes  in  its  form  and  location.  As  we  noted  in  the  previous
section,  rapid  urbanization  brought  with  it  an  increase  in  the  most  obvious
and  outward  signs  of  poverty  --  residential  crowding  --  located  near  the
doorsteps  of  the  urban  middle  classes.  The  impression  that  this  squalor  made
on  Henry  Mayhew  and  Charles  Dickens  is  iLportant  in  its  own  right:  it  has
shaped  the  popular  image  of  poverty  during  the  industrial  revolution.  Such
36evidence,  however,  will  not  easily  support  quantitative  claims  that  there  was
more  poverty  in  rapidly  industrializing  England  than  in  slower  industrializing
France  (Adelman  and  Morris,  1978,  p.254),  where  more  of  the  poor  were  rural
and  out  of  sight.  It  may  say  more  about  awareness  of  poverty  than  its
prevalence.
We  need  numbers.  Ideally,  we  would  like  to  have  nation  wide,  household
survey  data  of  the  kind  favored  by  Fields  (1989,  p.5)  in  his  recent  survey  of
poverty  and  economic  growth  in  the  contemporary  Third  World.  Unfortunately,  no
such  data  exists  for  most  of  the  century.  It  is  only  toward  the  end  of  the
19th  century  that  a  series  of  detailed  investigations  of  urban  poverty  were
made  in  specific  English  towns.  Although  these  investigations  were  still
locally  based,  they  can  claim  to  be  the  precursors  of  the  kind  of  household
surveys  on  which  Fields  would  like  us  to  rely.  (See  Hennock  (1987)  for  a
useful  historiography.)  For  earlier  periods,  we  have  to  rely  on  data  generated
by  the  provision  of  poor  relief  by  local  administrators  to  "paupers"  in
Britain  and  America.  These  official  pauper  statistics  include  time  series  of
numbers  of  paupers  and  relief  expenditure  by  local  area  and  year.  And  they
sometimes  tell  us  who  were  the  paupers.
Pauper  statistics  are  hardly  an  ideal  poverty  index,  so  what  can  they
tell  us? To  answer  this  question,  we  first  have  to  ask  what  determines  the
proportion  of  people  in  receipt  of  poor  relief  (pauperism  rates)  at  any  place
and  time.  We  can  divide  the  determinants  of  pauper  rates  into  the  demand  for
poor  relief  (the  extent  of  poverty),  the  supply  of  public  relief,  and  the
supply  of  private  substitutes.  All  are  of  interest  to  us  in  this  essay.
First,  consider  the  demand  for  poor  relief.  A rise  in  poverty,  either
generally  or  within  a  certain  age  and  gender  group,  should  increase  the  pauper
37rate.  Four forces  are  likely  to contribute  to this  result,  and  they  are  all
correlated  with  the  industrial  revolution:
(a) The  real  wages  paid to  unskilled  labor  might  lag  behind  or even
fall.  We have  discussed  these  trends  and  the  likely  effects  of
industrialization  on them  in Section  II;
(b)  Incomes  of the  poor  may  become  more  variable,  both  seasonally  and
with fluctuations  in  market  demand;
(c)  Secondary  labor  market  and  production  opportunities  may  disappear
for  those  in the  most  vulnerable  categories,  and  even  primary  occupations  of
some  of these  poor  may  be  displaced;
(d) Demographic  forces  may  glut the  labor  market  from  below  or increase
dependency  rates,  increasing  the  population  sbare  vulnerable  to  poverty  and
pauperism. These  forces  are  likely  to  be systematically  related  to the
demographic  transition,  a by product  of the  industrial  revolution.
The  second  major  determinant  of pauper  rates  is the  supply  of relief.
The  more  generous  is the  relief  offered  and the  easier  it is to  obtain,  the
higher  the  pauper  rate.  WacKinnon  (1984,  pp.171-3)  points  out that  the  costs
of obtaining  relief  might  be  higher  than  they  first  appear  to the  historian.
The social  stigma  and  signalling  effects  attached  to  having  once  been  a pauper
aight  diminish  future  access  to jobs  and  credit,  thus  raising  the  cost  of
going  on relief.
Third,  private  means  of support  for  the  poor  and  vulnerable  may  serve  as
a substitute  for  public  relief.  Thus  support  within  the  family,  by private
charity,  by private  insurance,  or by a member's  trade  union  reduces  the
numbers  on public  relief.
38Historians  have  almost  always  used  statistics  to assess  and  explain
government  policy  toward  the  poor;  i.e.  the  supply  of relief.  Higher  pauper
rates  and  expenditures  on relief  have,  therefore,  been  taken  to indicate  less
restricted  relief  practice  and  hence  a better  safety  net  for  the  poor.
However,  recent  innovative  work  by Joan  Hannon  (1984b,  1986)  on New  York State
and  by Mary  Mackinnon  (1984,  1986)  on England  suggests  that  pauper  rates  can
be used  to  get  a measure  of poverty  provided  we control  for  differences  in
policy.
In  both  Britain  and  America,  local  autborities  were  legally  obliged  to
provide  some  form  of relief  to applicants.  This relief  was  not  always
generous.  Indeed,  and  as  we shall  see  below,  it  was  a satter  of  central
government  concern  then  and  now  that  "over  generous"  assistance  should  not
encourage  the  poor  to  become  a tax  burden  on the  state  or reduce  individual
incentives  to work  and  save.  In  both  countries,  the  workhouse  or poorhouse
test  was  used  to diminish  this  risk.  Certain  classes  of paupers  were often
only  offered  relief  inside  the  workhouse.  It  was  hoped  that  the  unpleasant
conditions  of the  workhouse  would  discourage  application  by all  but the  most
needy.  Hannon  and  MacKinnon  suggest  that  the  proportion  of paupers  relieved
inside  the  workhouse  or poorhouse  is  a good  proxy  for  the  harshness  of this
aspect  of government  policy.
Figure  5 (taken  from  PP, 1900,  X, Appendix  II,  pp.10-11  and  22-23,  and
PP,  1904,  VXXXII)  tests  the  claim  that  pauper  statistics  can  be used  to proxy
poverty.  It uses  a survey  made at 28  places  in England  in 1899  of incomes  of
people  over  age  65.  The  horizontal  axis  shows  the  proportion  of old  people  who
had  incomes  under  lOs  a  week among  those  who's  incomes  are  known.  The  vertical
axis  shows  the  proportion  of old  people  surveyed  who  were  or had  been on
39outside  poor  relief.  There  is  a  clear  if  imperfect  relation  (correlation
coefficient:  0.576)  between  the  numbers  living  on  low  incomes  and  those  on
poor  relief.
Does  this  relation  hold  up  if  we  control  for  policy?  The  regressions  in
Table  8  suggest  that  it  does.  The  regressions  seek  to  control  for  policy  by
including  the  ratio  of  old  paupers  in  the  workbouse  to  total  old  paupers  for
the  administrative  areas  corresponding  to  the  sample  locations.  (In  London  a
high  inside  ratio  reflects  the  large  numbers  of  hospitals  so  an  interactive
dummy  variable  controls  for  London  policy.)  The  dependent  variable  is  the
sample  outdoor  pauperism  rate.  We  would  expect  the  proportion  of  paupers  to  be
high  where  the  proportion  on  low  incomes  is  high.  Where  the  proportion  of
paupers  indoors  is  high,  we  expect  to  find  fewer  outdoor  paupers  (reflecting
the  influence  of  the  harsb  policy).  In  both  regressions,  the  coefficients  on
low  incomes  and  policy  are  correctly  signed  and  significant.  If  we  take  the
log  form,  it  suggests  that  a  doubling  in  the  proportion  of  old  people  on  low
incomes  increases  the  proportion  on  out  relief  by  about  three  times.
Having  established  that  pauperiss  can  be  used  as  an  imperfect  proxy  for
poverty,  what  can  we  say  about  long  term  trends?  Unfortunately,  it  turns  out
to  be  difficult  to  control  for  policy  over  long  periods.  Firm  conclusions  are
hard  to  squeeze  out  of  the  data.
Figure  6 (from  Williams,  1981,  p.164)  shows  long  run  trends  in  the
pauper  rate  for  England,  1840-1939.  The  breaks  in  the  series  (for  example  in
1849)  represent  changes  in  the  way  in  which  the  pauperism  is  measured.  At
first  sight,  there  appears  to  be  a  clear  trend  downward  in  the  pauper  rate
from  the  famines  of  the  late  1840s  up  to  World  War  I. (The  post  war  figures
are  not  cosparable  as  they  include  recipients  of  new  state  benefits.)  However,
40a  closer  look  reveals  that  it  is  outdoor  pauperism  that  declined.  The  mean
number  of  paupers  relieved  in  the  vorkhouse  as  percentage  of  the  population  in
England  and  Wales  was  almost  unchanged  from  0.77%  in  1850  to  0.78%  in  1910
(Rose,  1972,  p.50).  Williams  concludes  that  the  overall  decline  is  evidence  of
the  authorities'  success  in  limiting  access  to  outdoor  relief  rather  than  an
improvement  in  the  standard  of  living  of  the  extreme  poor.  Nonetheless,  the
decline  in  overall  pauper  rates  after  the  1840s  is  consistent  with  the
inequality  and  unskilled  wage  trends  discussed  in  Section  II.
So  far,  we  have  discussed  trends  in  poverty  following  the  late  1840s.
What  about  the  early  'ndustrialization  period,  years  of  greater  interest  to
contemporary  analysis  of  Third  World  problems.  Here  we  are  on  even  shakier
ground.  The  original  "social  tables"  by  Gregory  King  (1688),  Joseph  Nassie
(1759),  Patrick  Colquhoun  (1801/3,  1812),  and  Dudley  Baxter  (1868)  took  very
different  approaches  to  estimating  pauperism,  but  they  did  supply  some  well-
informed  guesses.  The  revised  social  tables  imply  the  following  trends  for  the






The  shares  in  poverty  rose  in  the  late  18th  century,  a  period  of  rising
inequality  and  stable  real  wages  of  the  poor.  The  rate  of  fall  between  1812
and  1850  was  slow,  0.3%  per  decade,  while  it  accelerated  thereafter,  2.2%,  a
result  consistent  with  Figure  6  and  with  the  inequality  and  unskilled  real
wage  trends  docusented  in  Section  II.  However,  changes  in  supply  of  relief  may
41have  influenced  those  estimates  of  poverty,  and  relief  generosity  rose  up  to
the  early  19th  century,  falling  by  1850.  Thus  these  trends  also  must  be
treated  with  caution.
MacKinnon  (1984,  1986)  concentrates  on  long  run  trends  in  English  indoor
pauperism  from  1860  to  1910.  She  is  able  to  break  up  the  data  by  region  and
type  of  pauper  and,  by  using  regression  analysis,  purges  the  data  of  some  of
its  policy  component.  Wage  data  for  this  period  suggests  that  working  class
incomes  were  sharply  rising  (Williamson,  1985),  but,  except  for  specific
groups,  there  is  no  consistent  fall  in  the  policy  adjusted  indoor  pauper  rate
proxying  the  experience  of  the  extreme  poor.  This  prompts  MacKinnon  toward
tentative  pessimism  as  regards  late  19th  century  trickle  down  to  the  extreme
poor:
"...it  seems  highly  probable  that  the  very  poor  were  little  better  off
in  1910  thau  in  1860"  (MacKinnon,  1984,  p.271).
Hannon's  work  on  New  York  State  starts  earlier.  Table  9  reports  pauper
rates  for  New  York  State  at  five  year  intervals.  On  the  face  of  it,  pauperism
(and  poverty)  was  on  the  rise  throughout  the  antebellum  period  just  as  was
inequality.  While  Hannon  reserves  judgement  on  the  postbellum  figures,  she
views  the  trends  up  to  1860  as  evidence  of  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  poor
relief  and  thus  of  the  distress  of  the  poor,  especially  given  that  policy  was
becoming  "increasingly  stingy  across  the  antebellum  period"  (1984b,  p.1008).
Although  the  long-run  effect  of  early  industrialization  on  those  in
extreme  poverty  can  be  debated,  the  effect  of  short  run  macro  fluctuations  is
certain.  For  example,  when  English  growth  slows  down  dramatically  after  1900.
42there  is  an  unaubiguous  increase  in  indoor  pauperism  (Maclinnon,  1986,  p.333).
As  we  would  expect,  recessions  are  bad  for  the  poor  but  we  should  not  confuse
fluctuations  with  long  term  growtb  and  industrialization,  we  will  have  more  to
say  about  macro  instability  below.
Rp  ional  Variation  in  PovertZ:  Ingdustrialization  and  Urbanization
Can  we  get  a  better  impression  of  the  aggregate  effect  of  long  term
economic  developsent  on  the  poor  by  comparing  pauper  rates  in  different
regions?  Since  development  took  the  form  of  industrialization,  it  might  be
useful  to  compare  agricultural  with  iudustrial  counties.
Table  10  reports  pauperism  rates  for  industrial  and  agricultural
counties  for  1802-3,  in  the  early  stages  of  the  British  industrial  revolution.
when  London  is  excluded,  the  last  two  rows  of  the  table  suggest  that  there  was
no  obvious  difference  in  the  generosity  of  relief  policy  (as  measured  by  the
proportion  of  paupers  forced  into  the  workhouse)  between  agricultural  and
industrial  counties.  Bowever,  despite  the  bigh  agricultural  prices  at  that
time  caused  by  the  Napoleonic  war,  there  vas  a  far  higher  proportion  on  relief
in  the  agricultural  countries.  This  suggests  either  that  poverty  was  more
widespread  in  agricultural  areas  or  that  it  was  more  widespread  in  those  areas
(the  South)  most  distant  from  new  industrial  job  opportunities.  The  latter
seems  more  likely  given  the  favorable  prices  facing  agriculture  during  the
war.
Unfortunately,  this  parliamentary  return  omits  most  nortbern
agricultural  counties  so  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  whether  it  is  agriculture
uer  Le  or  location  that  is  driving  the  high  pauper  rates.  But  the  data  we  have
43suggests  that  it  it location.  Of  the  agricultural  countries,  the  two
northernmost  listed  (Lincoln  and  Rutland)  were  the  least  pauperized.  Among  the
ten  industrial  counties  listed,  three  of  the  four  with  pauper  rates  over  13%
are  southern  while  five  of  the  six  with  rates  under  10%  are  northerL.
It  appears  that  in  the  midst  of  the  British  industrial  revolution,  the
poor  fared  better  in  the  regiggs  that  underwent  industrialization  wbether  or
not  their  imediate  locality  was  agricultural  or  industrial.
Evidence  from  the  end  of  the  century  provides  further  support  for  the
view  that  wbetber  the  immediate  locality  was  agricultural  or  industrial  had
less  effect  on pauperism  rates  than  whether  the  area lay  within  a region  that
had  undergone  industrialization.  a  survey  of aged  paupers  in 1892  (P,  1895,
C.7684,  vol.XtV,  p.cvi)  showed  that  in  some  regions  of  the  country  old  age
pauperism  was  higher  in  agricultural  localities  but  in  other  regions  it  was
higher  in  industrial  localities.  Whatever  the  main  source  of  local  exployment,
however,  the  survey  found  old  pauperism  lower  in  the  North,  where
industrialization  had  been  most  dramatic.
RacKinnon  (1984,  pp.198-9,  222-3,  1987  p.621)  has  done  work  for  England
in  the  1860s  that  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  poverty  was  more  intense  in
the  regions  that  were  slow  to  industrialize  and  that  this  was  more  important
than  whether  a  locality  within  the  region  was  industrial  or  agricultural.
Pauper  rates  in  the  largely  agricultural  South  were  up  to  twice  as  high  as
those  in  the  industrial  North.
It  seems  likely  that  the  effect  on  poverty  of  bigher  incomes  and  greater
variety  of  earning  opportunities  generated  by  industrialization  in  the  North
spilled  over  into  the  agricultural  areas  within  the  region.  Labor  mobility
clearly  would  account  for  that  result.  Labor  could  and  did  move  to  urban  areas
44witbin  the  North  and  within  the  South  but  it  was  more  reluctant  to  move  longer
distances  from  the  Soutb  to  the  industrializing  Wortb  (Williamson,
forthcoming,  chp.2).  The  result  was  lower  wages  and  greater  poverty  in  the
South.
MacRinnon's  regressions  also  show  that  pauper  rates  in  the  1860s  were
significantly  lower  in  those  areas  which  had  population  growth  rates  above  the
regional  average.  These  were  areas  in  which  growth  was  occurring  fastest  and
to  which  labor  was  migrating.  There  is  a  problem  of  simultaneity  here:  were
the  low  pauperism  rates  one  reason  why  the  labor  imigrated  or  was  the  rapid
growth  in  these  areas  pulling  people  out  of  poverty?  Probably  both  forces  were
at  work.  As  yet  we  do  not  have  the  necessary  evidence  to  untangle  these  two
effects  but  what  we do  have  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  view  that  the  poor
were  better  off  in  rapidly  growing  areas.
Wbat  about  urbanization  itself?  Linear  regression  analysis  comparing  the
degree  of  urbanization  (local  population  density)  with  the  pauper  ratio  on
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  shows  only  a  weak  tendency  for  poverty  to  be  worse
in  larger  and  more  dense  towns  after  controlling  for  employment  six,  policy
and  other  influences  (Rannon,  1984b;  MacKinnon,  1986).  A result  from  the
British  1892  enquiry  that  also  shows  up  in  the  general  pauper  census  of  1906
is  that  there  is  no  clear  relation  between  the  degree  of  urbanization  and
pauperism.  Table  11  shows  that  pauper  rates  were  highest  in  London  but  for
smaller  towns  and  cities  the  relation  is  mixed.
Within  towns  it  appears  that  concentration  on  a  single,  high  skill
industry  resulted  in  the  lowest  poverty  rates.  At  the  end  of  the  period,  we
have  household  survey  evidence  from  six  medium  sized  towns:  York  (Rowntree,
1901),  Bolton,  Northampton,  Reading,  Stanley,  and  Warrington  (Bowley  and
45Burnett-Burst,  .915;  Rowley  and  Iogg,  1925).  Table  12  compares  the  extent  of
poverty  (i.e.,  not  just  pauperism)  in  these  towns.  What  is  notable  is  that  the
towns  with  the  lowest  poverty  shares  are  those  that  are  the  most  specialized;
Stanley  in  pining,  Bolton  in  textiles,  and  Northampton  in  boots  and  shoes.
Reading  and  York  were  the  least  industrialized  towns  in  the  sample  with
Reading  the  only  true  Soutbern  town.  Northampton  was  not  a  northern  smokestack
town  but  was  "tbe  very  center  of  one  of  the  most  prosperous  industries  of  the
country"  (Bowley  and  Burnett-Hurst,  1915,  p.49)  and  one  in  which  a  craft
sector  survived.  Varrington  was  both  a  smokestack  town  and  located  in  the
industrial  heartland  but  it  did  not  appear  to  have  a single  dominant
successful  industry.
Who  Were  the  Poor  and  Who  Were  the  Pauners?  Links  to  the  posoarahlic
Trasaitiga
It  important  to  ask  who  were  poor  and  who  were  paupers  for  two  reasons.
First,  economic  development  may  affect  different  groups  in  different  ways.  If
we  can  identify  the  groups  that  are  poor  we  may  be  able  to  say  something  more
useful  about  the  relation  of  poverty  to  growth.  Second,  there  may  be
differences  between  the  composition  of  the  poor  and  that  of  the  paupers.  The
poor  were  largely  in  households  of  low-wage,  unskilled  workers  so  the  main
forces  driving  changes  in  their  well  being  were  those  4iscussed  in  Section  II.
The  paupers,  on  the  other  hand,  represent  the  extrep_  poor.  Their  well  being
may  be  less  directly  related  to  the  wages  of  the  unskilled.
Vale  able-bodied  pauperism  fell  over  the  century  in  England:  the  number
of  male  able  bodied  paupers  in  1901  was  approximately  7%  of  the  number
relieved  in  this  category  in  1802-3  (Williams,  1981,  p.40-1).  Part  of  this
46fall  was  the  result  of  a  conscious  effort  by  Britisb  authorities  to  refuse
outdoor  relief  to  healthy  adult  males.  The  other  force  was  market  related  --
rising  wages  driven  by  the  forces  discussed  in  Section  II.  The  decline  in  male
able-bodied  pauperism  was  neither  steady  nor  continuous.  As  we  shall  discuss
below,  recessions  pusbed  unemployed  workers  into  pauperism.  But  it  is  clear
that  by  the  end  of  the  century,  we  must  look  beyond  the  adult  male  workforce
when  discussing  pauperism  and  extreme  poverty.
In  the  19th  century  as  now,  the  old,  the  sick,  widows,  single  parents
and  their  children,  and  those  in  large  families  were  much  more  likely  to  be
very  poor  than  other  groups  in  the  population.  Poverty  obeys  a  life  cycle
pattern.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7 (taken  from  ",  1910,  LIII,  Appendix
XXV,  Part  II,  p.56,  108-9)  which  shows  pauper  rates  in  Rngland  and  Wales  in
March  1906  by  age  group.  The  solid  line  shows  total  pauper  rates  and  the
broken  line  indoor  pauper  rates.
It  is clear  that  pauper  rates  rise  steeply  in  old  age.  Almost  one  in
five  of  the  population  over  65  and  almost  one  in  four  of  those  over  70  were
receiving  poor  relief  at  the  time  of  this  census.  In  part  this  may  have  been
due  to  more  generous  state  relief  policy  for  the  old  than  for  others,  but  the
fact  that  the  proportion  of  the  old  in  the  workhouse  was  also  high  suggests
that  part  of  the  high  old  age  pauper  rates  was  due  to  old  age  poverty.
Those  over  65  constituted  28.3%  of  all  paupers  in  the  1906  census  and
35.3%  of  those  in  the  workhouses.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  data  on  the  ages
of  outdoor  paupers  before  1890,  but  the  percentage  of  paupers  who  were  listed
as  "not  able-bodied"  (a  category  in  which  80%  were  over  60  in  1906)  rises  from
38.9%  in  1850  to  a  peak  of  49.2%  in  1900.  The  percentage  of  indoor  paupers
aged  over  65  rose  in  the  same  period  from  19.8%  to  36.5%  of  the  workhouse
47population  (Williams,  1981,  pp.204-5).  In  both  cases,  part  of  the  rise  was  due
to  the  restriction  of  outdoor  relief  to  the  old  that  took  vlace  in  the  18709
but  (see  Table  13)  the  trends  continue  until  1900  suggesti  g  that  government
policy  is  not  the  only  driving  force.
Three  conclusions  seen  warranted  by  the  data.  First,  the  economic
position  of  the  old  was  falling  behind  that  of  the  rest  of  the  working  class
in  the  late  19tb  century.  Second,  and  as  we  shall  discuss  in  Section  IV,
English  poor  relief  was  becoming  less  generous  to  the  old  over  the  same
period.  The  second  point  may  be  part  of  the  explanation  of  the  first  but  the
high  number  of  old  in  poverty  suggests  that  we  should  pay  special  attention  to
the  effects  of  industrialization  on  the  old.  Third,  as  the  size  of  this  older
and  more  vulnerable  age  class  increased  over  time,  it  should  have  raised  total
numbers  in  poverty.  This  became  increasingly  the  case  as  Britain  began  to  move
along  the  downside  of  the  demographic  transition  and  the  older  individuals
increased  in  relative  importance.  Similarly,  an  increasing  number  of  aged  were
left  behind  by  their  children  who  migrated  in  increasing  numbers  to  cities  in
Britain  and  the  New  World  (Williamson,  1986).
Let  us  return  for  a  moment  to  Figure  7.  In  addition  to  the  high  pauper
rates  in  old  age  there  was  a  much  smaller  "hump"  during  childhood,  peaking
between  10  and  14  and  then  falling  rapidly  as  the  teenager  entered  the  labor
market.  This  pattern  is  consistent  witb  the  observation  that  household  poverty
often  results  from  a  high  ratio  of  dependents  to  earners.  Was  child  pauperism
primarily  due  to  the  presence  of  many  dependents  in  large  families,  or  was  it
due  to  the  fact  that  there  were  few  earners  in  the  household?
Table  14  shows  the  household  circumstances  of  all  pauper  children  in
England  and  Wales  in  1908.  It  is  clear  that  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century
48only  *  sinority  of  child  paupers  were  in  two  parent  families.  Over  half  of  all
child  paupers  were  in  households  beaded  by  woven,  especially  widows.  The
circumstances  of  women  and  children  were  closely  related.
Table  15  shows  the  ratio  of  female  to  sale  pauper  rates  by  age  group,
for  England  and  Wales,  in  1906.  The  proportion  of  women  who  were  paupers  rises
relative  to  the  proportion  of  men  througb  early  adult  life  peaking  between
ages  35  and  45  and  then  falling.  The  upswing  coincides  with  childbearing  age
and  was  probably  due  to  the  burdens  of  parenthood  especially  on  single  or
widowed  motbers.  Wosen  were  more  likely  to  be  driven  to  pauperism  by
parenthood  tn2an  men.  The  downswing  may  reflect  a  greater  tendency  for  women  to
be  supported  in  their  children's  homes  than  men,  especially  where
grandchildren  needed  minding.
The  vulnerability  of  widows  to  pauperisa  should  be  familiar  to  anyone
acquainted  with  modern  developing  countries,  and  this  phenomenon  did  not
originate  with  industrialization.  What  evidence  we  have  for  pre-industrial
England  suggests  that  it  was  far  harder  for  a  widow  to  remarry  than  a  widower
and  especially  hard  if  the  widow  bad  dependent  children.  Supporting  a  family
as  a  single  parent  was  difficult.  Consequently,  almost  40%  of  widow  headed
households  in  18th  century  England  were  on  relief  (Smith,  1984,  pp.435-6,  444-
6).
Table  16  shows  tbat  there  was  a  decline  in  the  proportion  of  widows  with
children  who  were  paupers  in  late  l9th  century  England  (column  B)  along  with
declines  in  the  proportion  of  paupers  who  were  in  widow  headed  households
(column  A)  and  a  decline  in  the  overall  proportion  of  paupers  who  were
childres  (column  C).  Once  again,  these  trends  can  be  explained  partly  by
government  policy.  Outdoor  relief  to  these  groups,  as  to  the  old,  was
49systematically  cvt  in  the  1870s.  lowsver,  tbi  decline  continues  beyond  the
period  of  less  generous  relief  policy,  up  to  the  eve  of  World  Var  1. This  is
probably  due  to  the  accelerated  decline  in  fertility  after  the  1880s
(Naclinuon,  1986,  pp.332-3;  Boyer  and  Williamson,  fortbcoming).  As  the  number
of  dependents  declined,  aore  single  parents  were  able  to  get  by  without  being
driven  into  pauperism.  As  in  Table  16,  column  D shows  lower  fertility  was  not
reflected  in  fewer  children  per  widow  on  relief,  but  it ma  reflected  in  there
being  fewer  widows  forced  onto  relief.  These  dependency  rate  effects  should
bave  played  a  symmetric  role  when  poverty  rates  were  rising  in  the  late  18th
gad  early  19th  century,  on  the  upswing  of  the  English  demographic  transition
which  yields  peak  rates  of  population  growth  between  1820  and  1840.  That  is,  a
sood  share  of  rising  poverty  up  to  1820  or  1840  is  likely  to  bave  been  driven
by  rising  fertility  and  increasing  dependency  rates.  The  opposite  seems  to
have  been  true  in  the  late  19th  century.
Sickness  is  often  a  cause  of  and  caused  by  poverty.  About  half  of  able
bodied  paupers  in  Rngland  from  1891  to  1908  were  relieved  due  to  sickness
either  of  themselves  or  a  family  member.  The  diseases  that  figured  most
prominently  among  those  aged  16  to  50  were  forms  of  tuberculosis,  bronchitis
and  pneumonia.  We  shall  have  more  to  say  about  sickness  among  the  poor,  and
its  correlation  with  urbanization,  in  Section  IV  below.
Ve  have  now  looked  at  the  composition  of  English  pavperism.  Bow  about
the  composition  of  English  poverty?  We  can  get  an  impression  of  urban  poverty
at  the  end  of  the  century  from  the  social  investigations  of  Booth,  Rowntree
and  Bowley.  Table  17  gives  a  breakdown  of  the  proximate  causes  of  poverty,
and  it  is  clear  that  most  of  the  poverty  found  in  these  towns  was  associated
with  low  wages  or  large  families.  Ev  n  at  the  end  of  the  period,  the  lower  end
50of  the  unskilled  wage  range  was  insufficient  for  all  but  small  families.  It  is
worth  noting  that  the  lowest  proportion  of  the  poor  associated  witb  very  low
wages  (insufficient  for  three  children)  was  found  in  those  towns  where  there
were  fewest  poor.  As  we  discussed  above,  the  specialized  industries  in  these
towns  appears  to  have  pushed  wages  up  above  the  poverty  line.
Widow  headed  housebolds,  the  old  and  the  sick  made  up  a  far  smaller
proportion  of  the  poor  than  of  the  extreme  poor,  that  is  of  paupers.  A  table
of  poverty  rates  by  ages  constructed  by  Rowntree  (1901,  p.443)  for  York  shows
the  same  increase  in  old  age  as  we  saw  for  the  pauper  cycle  in  Figure  7,
although  not  as  dramatic.  As  with  pauper  rates,  there  was  a  bulge  in  poverty
rates  before  age  15  with  approximately  27%  of  working  class  children  living  in
poverty.  But  whereas  before  we  saw  that  most  child  pauperism  was  explained  by
single  earner  families,  most  child  poverty  occurred  in  large  families  where
the  chief  earner  was  low  paid.
The  difference  in  the  composition  of  the  poor  relative  to  that  of
paupers  is  explained  by  Rowntree's  poverty  line  being  drawn  at  a  much  higher
level  than  some  official  line  below  which  people  became  paupers  on  relief.
The  poor  as  defined  by  Rowntree's  poverty  line  included  16%  of  the  people
surveyed,  while  total  pauper  rates  in  ZnglanA  and  Wales  at  this  time  were  at
2.2%.
Support  for  the  view  that  the  paupers  represent  the  poorest  of  the  poor
can  be  found  in  Rowntree's  own  investigation  of  York  in  1899.  Rowntree  divided
the  households  into  classes.  The  composition  of  the  poorest  class  (those  with
a  household  incone  eauivalent  to  less  than  18s  a  week  for  a  family  with  two
adults  and  two  to  four  children)  looked  much  like  the  composition  of
pauperism.  That  is,  47%  of  its  sembers  were  in  widow  or  single  parent  headed
51households  and  19%  were  in  households  where  the  head  was  ill  or  old  (1901,
p.45.).
Pauperism  was  a  level  below  most  poor  households  in  England  at  the  end
of  our  period,  but  it  was  not  divorced  from  general  poverty  or  from  the  wage
economy.  The  low  paid,  many  of  whom  comprised  the  poor,  were  also  those  most
likely  to  fall  into  pauperism  in  old  age  or  in  the  event  of  a  crisis  such  as
the  illness  or  death  of  the  prime  wage  earner.
The  1906  special  census  includes  a  breakdown  of  paupers  by  past
occupations  and  a  separate  pauper  rate  for  each  past  occupation  group.  Table
18  draws  on  this  information.  For  adult  males  the  average  pauper  rate  was  213
per  10,000.  General  laborers  and  those  in  arricultural  occupations  --  the
largest  two  categories  of  low  paid,  unskilled  workers  --  hXd  the  highest
probabilities  of  falling  into  pauperism,  with  pauper  rates  of  848.6  and  397.3
respectively.  If  the  pattern  of  past  occupations  of  paupers  in  1906  is
representative  of  what  went  before,  it  underlines  the  importance  of  the
returns  to different  classes  of labor  in  explaining  poverty.  We discussed  what
underlies  changes  in  the  pay  structure  in  Section  II.
What  about  the  U.S.?  Hannon  gives  the  composition  of  paupers  in  New  York
State  and  it  is  reproduced  here  as  lable  19.  The  composition  of  U.S  relief
recipients  looks  more  like  the  English  poor  than  the  Englisb  paupers.  But
there  is  no  mystery  here.  New  York  State  poor  relief  was  more  generous  than
its  English  counterpart  so  more  people  were  on  relief:  6.6%  of  the  population
in  1860  and  3.5%  of  the  population  in  1895  (see  Table  9),  compared  with  pauper
rates  in  England  of  4.3%  and  2.7%  respectively.
52Seasons,  Cycles,  and  Secondary  Activities
By secondary  occupations,  we mean  jobs  typically  undertaken  either  by
secondary  earners  in  a household  or by the  prime  earner  as a secondary  income
source.  What  were  these  occupations?  Before  and  during  the  early  stages  of
industrialization,  rural  domestic,  household,  or cottage  industries  such  as
spinning  and  weaving  often  supplemented  the  household's  main  income  source.
Later  in the  industrial  revolution,  we see  the  development  of  what  are  called
the  "sweated"  trades,  like  clothes-making  shops,  most  notably  in large  cities
like  London  and  New  York  City.  Throughout  we see  those  occupations  that  are
now  associated  with the  "informal  sector"  in the  Third  World  like  cleaning  or
street  hawking.
Domestic  manufacturing  was  hardly  the  only secondary  occupation
important  in rural  areas.  Whether  owner  occupiers  or tenants,  small  farmers
often  had  a variety  of land  vses in  addition  to their  major  crop.  Households
whose  main  source  of income  was  wage labor  also  cultivated  a small  plot on
which  they  grew  crops  either  for  own  consumption  or for  the  local  market.
Even  landless  households  in pre-industrial  England  kept  their  own  livestock,
using  the  commons  for  grazing,  while  urban  workers  often  kept  pigs  and
chickens.
Such  activities  were  of special  importance  to the  poor.  These  secondary
activities  formed  part  of the  "safety  net"  against  poverty.  At times  of
crisis,  sucb  as periods  of high  unemployment  or the  death  of the  chief  wage
earner,  the  secondary  occupation  became  the  primary  income  source.  Secondary
industries  often  had  a  different  seasonal  cycle  than  primary  occupations  and
hence  smoothed  both  demands  on household  labor  and thus  the  household's
53income.  Outlets  for  the  products  and  services  of secondary  industries  were
often  localized  and  hence  were less  subject  to macroeconomic  demand
fluctuations  than  the  wage income  of the  primary  earner.  A variety  of
household  income  sources  spread  market  and  other  risks.
Furthermore,  these  sectors  typically  employed  a high  proportion  of old
age,  child  and  female  labor;  groups  which  we bave  now  identified  as the  most
vulnerable  to  extreme  poverty.  The  fate  of such  industries  in the  course  of
industrialization  can  thus  have great  impact  on poverty.  The  importance  of
these  secondary  activities  to poverty  is not  very  different  in  modern
industrializing  countries  than  what  it  was in  the  19th  century.
The  role  that  secondary  activities  or  occupations  for  the  poor  close  to
pauperism  can  be illustrated  as late  as the  turn  of the  century.  Secondary
activities  often  appear  among  the  occupations  reported  in the  1906  English
pauper  census.  Table  20 lists  some  examples  of high  female  pauper  rates  for
various  sectors.  As the  census  officials  noted,  the  female  occupation  list  was
dominated  by jobs that  older  women  entered  in  an attempt  to avoid  sliding  into
pauperism.  The  highest  pauper  rates  outside  of agriculture  were  found  among
charwomen,  laundry  women,  hawkers  and  street  sellers,  all  informal  service  or
sweated  occupations.  These  industries  were  those  in  wbich  it  was  easiest  for
poor  women,  such  as  widows,  to find  work.
The  high female  pauper  rate  among  agricultural  workers  reflects,  in
part,  low  wages  of these.  More  importantly,  by this  time  few  women  were
working  for  wages  in agriculture  --  the  absolute  number  of female  paupers  who
had  been  employed  in  agriculture  is not  very  higb.  Those  women  who  worked  in
the  agricultural  sector  no doubt  included  many  who  were forced  into  the  wage
labor  market  by family  crisis.
54By  1906,  domestic  industries  do  not  figure  so  prominently  among  the
occupations  of  paupers,  but  Table  20  still  shows  high  pauper  rates  among
seamstresses  and  tailoresses.  Table  18  showed  high  pauper  rates  among  men  in
the  same  sector.  These  trades  were  undertaken  partly  in  sweat  shops  and  partly
at  home  or  domestically.  There  were  still  disproportionately  large  numbers  of
paupers  from hose  domestic  industries  still  struggling  to  survive  in  the
minor  textile  trades  (textile  industries  other  than  cotton,  wool  and  worsted,
and  silk  manufacture),  but  the  minor  textiles  were  no  longer  a  viable  means  of
support  for  the  majority  of  the  poor  in  19th  century  England,  and  had  ceased
to  be  important  among  the  occupations  listed  by  paupers.
The  fact  that  the  urban  poor  were  frequently  employed  in  secondary
industries  (Treble,  1979,  pp.13-51)  tolether  with  the  preponderance  of  paupers
ccaing  from  sweated  and  informal  occupations,  led  many  contemporaries  and  some
historians  to  write  as  if  the  existence  of  such  trades  was  the  cause  of  19th
century  poverty.  In  fact,  life  for  the  poor  would  have  been  worse  without
these  industries.  When  new  factory  industries  in  the  North  of  England
undermined  the  older  trades  in  London,  sweated  trades  grew  up  in  the  capital
to  absorb  the  displaced  poor  (Jones,  1971).  Immigrants  were  absorbed  in
similar  occupations  on  the  eastern  seaboard  cities  of  the  U.S..  Vith  abundant
unskilled  labor  supplies,  informal  sector  pay  was  often  low  and  work
conditions  in  the  sweat  shops  often  ugly,  but  these  industries  did  not  cause
poverty;  they  were  a  symptom  of  it.  If  these  activities  had  not  existed,  the
poor  would  have  been  forced  to  find  work  even  lower  down  the  marginal  product
of  labor  curve,  or  perhaps  to  become  wards  of  the  state.
Why  do  we  find  the  most  vulnerable  groups  --  the  old,  women  and  children
--  employed  in  domestic  industries?  Low  strength  requirements  of  most
55domestic  tasks  offers  one  explanation.  In addition,  domestic  workers  could,  to
a large  degree,  arrange  the  demands  on their  labor  to accommodate  supply,  the
latter  determined  by child  rearing  and  outside  labor  demands.  Production
patterns  could  be altered  to incorporate  needy  kin (Hannon,  1984,  p.1019),  and
access  to  these  occupations  was free  of restraint. Working  in  domestic
industries  was  convenient  for  women  with  children  and for  older  people  both
because  the  work  was  located  in the  home  and  because  the  pace  and  timing  of
work  was relatively  flexible.
We have  reasons  to believe,  therefore,  that  the  presence  of domestic  or
household  industries  and  small  land  allotments  reduced  pauperism.  They
provided  alternate  income  streams  which  became  very important  in the  event  of
the  chief  wage  earner  being  incapacitated  or of some  collapse  in  the  demand
for  market  labor;  they  smoothed  out  the  seasonal  fluctuations  in the  demand
for  market  labor;  they  provided  employment  for  secondary  workers  in  households
headed  by a primary  worker;  and  they  provided  employment  for  those  groups  most
vulnerable  to  poverty.
Is there  any  evidence  to support  this  view? First,  while  rarely
agreeing  on anything  else,  contemporary  experts  on poverty  and  the  rural
economy  in  late  18th  century  England  (such  as Arthur  Young,  David  Davies  and
Frederic  Morton  Eden)  all  agreed  that  the  erosion  of allotments  and  domestic
industries  in the  South  were a  major  cause  of pauperism  (Boyer,  forthcoming,
cb.2).  Second,  George  Boyer (forthcoming,  ch.3)  has  undertaken  an impressive
empirical  analysis  of pauper  relief  expenditures  in the  Soutb  of England  in
the  first  part  of the  aineteenth  century.  Boyer  found  that  the  presence  of
cottage  industries  in  an area  had a significant  negative  effect  on pauper
rates.  Large  allotments  also  appear  to  have reduced  relief  burdens.  Third,  in
56her  study  of  pauperism  in  New  York  State  in  the  second  quarter  of  the
nineteenth  century,  Joan  Hannon  (1984,  1986)  looked  at  the  effects  of
household  production  on  pauper  rates  in  different  areas  and  over  time. She
also  found  that  household  production  was  negatively  correlated  with  pauperism.
We  can  also  document  the  effect  of  the  demise  of  a  particular  household
industry  on  employment  opportunities  for  women  and  the  old.  Quadagno  (1982)
has  made  a  useful  in  depth  study  cf  the  town  of  Chilvers  Coton  (near  Coventry,
England)  in  the  latter  half  of  the  19th  century.  The  main  household  industry
of  the  town  in  1851  was  silk  ribbon  weaving.  Two  classic  forces  of  economic
development  undermined  this  local  industry.  The  repeal  of  tariffs  increased
cospetition  from  the  French  silk  industry,  and  new  technology  led  to
competition  from  emerging  factories.  Between  1851  and  1901,  male  employment  in
the  silk  industry  in  Ingland  fell  from  53,936  to  11,058,  and  female  employment
from  76,787  to  26,422.
In  1851,  only  28%  of  silk  weavers  were  male  in  Chilvers  Coton,  and  of
these  40%  were  under  20  or  over  60.  Female  labor  participation  rates  were  85%
between  ages  20  and  40,  and  still  50%  among  those  over  70.  Figures  8  and  9
show  the  labor  participation  rates  over  the  life  cycle  for  males  and  females
in  1851,  and  then  again  in  1901  after  the  demise  of  the  household  industry.
For  males,  the  main  change  is  the  eradication  of  old  age  employment  with
participation  rates  falling  dramatically  for  those  over  age  60  in  1901.  For
females  the  change  is  even  more  dramatic:  labor  participation  was  reduced  at
all  ages  with  only  the  young  retaining  employment  in  domestic  services  (not  to
be  confused  with  domestic  industry).
In  Chilvers  Coton,  the  decline  of  a  locally  important  household
industry,  due  to  two  key  processes  of  economic  development,  market  expansion
57and  new technology,  led  to the  virtual  eradication  of labor  opportunities  for
women  and che  old.  It is reasonable  to  expect  that  in the  transition  these
groups  became  even  more  vulnerable  to poverty.  The  story  seems  to  be the  same
in  early  19th  century  New  England  when the  cotton  textile  factories  wiped  out
domestic  spinning  almost  overnight,  or in late  18th  and  early  19th  century
Ireland  where  factory  competition  from  the  Lancashire  mills  in England  did  the
same.
It would  be a  mistake,  however,  to give  the  impression  that  economic
development  and  technical  change  always  displaces  such  secondary  industries.
It can  also  create  them.  A good  historical  example  is offered  by the  evolution
of textiles  technology  using  cotton  and  wool.  In the  late  18th  century,  new
factory  technologies  destroyed  the  household  band-spinning  industry,  but the
eeaper thread  it  produced  led  to  a boom  in the  household  weaving  industry.
The  number  of  handloom  weavers  in Britain  increased  by a factor  of five
between  1780  and  1810  to  make  use  of the  cheaper  input  that  new  factory-based
technology  had  produced.  In the  early  19th  cent-ry,  new  factory  technologies
then  undercut  the  hand  loom  weavers  so that  by 1851  their  number  had  returned
to its  1780  level.  Nor  was this  the  end  of the  process.  The  new  cheaper  cloth
was a factor  in the  emergence  of new  sweated  clothes-making  industries  where
it  was an input.  These  industries  also  benefitted  from  technical  changes  such
as the  invention  of the  sewing  machine.  By the  end  of the  period,  however,
even the  sweated  trades  were  being  displaced  by factory  production;  Feinstein
(1987,  graph  1)  shows  that  wages  in the  clothing  sector  were  falling  at least
relative  to those  economy-wide.
The  fact  that  the  same  new  factory  technologies  which  displaced  one
domestic  industry  often  created  another  should  not,  however,  lead  us to the
58false  conclusion  that  the  extreme  poor  were  unaffected  on  net.  The  new
industries  were  often  distant  from  those  they  replaced.  And  when  an  industry
was  overtaken  by  techbology,  the  old  were  often  in  the  worst  position.  They
lost  a  return  on  acquired,  product-specific  skills,  and  it  was  often  hardest
for  thes  to  migrate  since  they  had  invested  most  in  their  current  location  and
had  a  shorter  future  life  over  which  to  defray  the  cost  of  a  move.  A  typical
pattern  appears  to  have  been  for  the  children  of  displaced  workers  to  migrate
while  the  old  stayed  put,  suffering  the  falling  wages  and  pauperism  that
accompanied  deskilling.
The  main  factors  deteraining  the  returns  to  unskilled  labor  were
discussed  in  Section  II.  However,  the  conditions  of  labor  supply  to  secondary
activities  deserves  separate  consideration.  As  we  have  already  mentioned,  the
poor  would  gain  easy  access  to  tbese  industries  thus  depressing  wages  for
incumbents.  And  as  Boyer  (forthcoming)  has  pointed  out,  the  long  run  supply  of
labor  (i.e.,  labor  migration  to  the  areas  wbere  these  industries  flourished)
was  determined  not  by  wages  in  the  domestic  industries  alone  but  by  the  total
household  incomes  obtainable  in  the  area  including  the  job  opportunities  of
the  primary  wage  earner.  Thus,  in  rural  domestic  or  urban  informal  and  sweated
sectors,  widows  had  to  compete  with  unmarried  young  women  for  whom  the
employment  was  often  a  source  of  supplementary  family  income.  Incomes  from
these  secondary  activities  may  have  been  sufficient  when combined  with  primary
incomes,  but  they  represented  very  low  pay  in  the  absence  of  some  primary
income  source.
How  did  industrialization  affect  seasonal  fluctuations  in  labor  demand?
This  is  an  important  question  since  we  know  that  seasonality  in  labor  demand
also  produced  seasonality  in  pauperism  especially  among  able  bodied  men.  We
59have  already  mentioned  that  secondary  industries  smoothed  botb  the  seasonal
demand  for  labor  and  household  income  either  by  having  different  peaks  or  by
its  inherent  flexibility  in  time  demands.  The  factory-induced  destruction  of
the  cottage  industry  was  one  reason  why  seasonal  income  cycles  became  more
pronounced  in  18th  century  England  (Snell,  1985,  chs.1,  4).  Increased  crop
specialization,  driven  by  rising  grain  prices,  had  the  same  effect.  This
process  also  applied  to  the  U.S.  where  western  agriculture  became  inkreasingly
linked  to  world  markets  by  transport  development,  encouraging  specialization
in  grain.  Enclosures  in  18th  century  England  had  the  same  effect  by
encouraging  crop  specialization  and  by  removing  secondary  occupations  such  as
keeping  livestock.  The  effect  of  enclosure  shows  up  clearly  in  Figure  10.  The
figure  shows  the  percentage  of  paupers  over  the  whole  year  that  were  relieved
in  a  given  month.  The  figure  shows  that  the  pattern  of  labor  demand  after
enclosure  was  much  more  seasonally  pronounced  than  before.  Snell  has  similar
evidence  for  the  effect  of  grain  specialization  and  new  threshing  machines  on
seasonality.
While  these  forces  probabl)  made  the  poor  more  vulnerable  to  seasonal
cycles,  they  are  not  typical  of  the  effect  of  development  on  seasonality.  As
Peter  Timmer  (1969)  has  shown,  even  within  agriculture  new  crops  such  as
turnips  spread  out  labor  demands  over  the  year. NacKinnon  (1986,  p.325)  shows
that  the  difference  between  summer  and  winter  pauper  rates  declined  across
late  19th  century  England.  In  general,  therefore,  industrialization  led  to
less  seasonal  variation  in  pauper  rates.  Although  many  industrial  activities
like  construction  remained  seasonal,  as  development  moved  employment  away  from
agriculture,  it  eventually  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  importance  of  seasonal
fluctuations  in  labor  demand.
60While  development  may  have  reduced  the  problem  of  seasonality  in  labor
demand,  it  increased  the  problem  of  market-oriented  macro  shocks.  To  see  the
ispcrtance  of  macroeconomic  cycles  on  poverty,  Figure  11  plots  male  able-
bodied  indoor  pauper  rates  in  three  areas  of  England  against  unemployment  from
1850  to  1910.  (The  short  run  instability  is  due  to  the  seasonal  fluctuations
discussed  above).  A strong  relation  between  the  pauper  rates  and  unemployment
is  apparent,  with  pauperism  following  unemployment  with  a  slight  lag.  This
result  is  confirmed  by  regression  analysis,  as  is  the  relationship  between
pauperism  and  other  macroeconomic  indicators  (NacKinnon,  1984,  1986).  The
relationship  between  pauperism  and  the  macroeconomy  was  strongest  in  the  North
where  industrialization  had  proceeded  furthest  (see  also  Southall,  1988).
Hannon  argues  that  the  changing  structure  of  pauperism  in  the  U.S.  in  the
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  also  due  to  greater  reliance  on  the
market.  Short  term  unemployment  became  a  more  important  cause  of  distress  as
people  became  more  dependent  on  specialized  wage  labor  and  as  domestic
employment  declined.
In  short,  poverty  became  more  subject  to  market  fluctuations  in  the  late
19th  century  as  technology  and  the  division  of  labor  led  economic  agents  to  be
more  closely  dependent  on  the  market.  Technical  change  and  market  development
undermined  secondary  activities.  These  activities  were  important  supplements
to  primary  household  incomes  especially  when  the  primary  wage  earner  was
incapacitated,  during  seasonal  episodes  of  low  labor  demand,  and  when
macroeconomic  shocks  caused  unemployment.  They  were  also  important  as  primary
income  sources  for  certain  social  groups  fcr  whom  pauperization  was  a  greater
risk.  One  lesson  we  can  take  from  the  19th  century  is  that  it  is  the  old  and
women  with  children  who  iind  it  hardest  to  adapt  to  these  economic  events.
61IV.  POLICY  AND  POVERTY
Overview
This  essay  is  already  very  long,  but  we  cannot  leave  our  survey  of  the
connections  between  19th  century  industrialization  and  poverty  without  some
attention  to  policy.  There  are  two  issues  which  this  section  confronts.  First,
the  impact  of  macropolicy  on  the  poor.  Second,  the  response  of  policy  to
poverty.  The  literature  on  both  is  enormous,  so  that  we  will  have  to  be
selective.  Although  it  was  clearly  the  most  important  in  the  19th  century,
only  one  aspect  of  macropolicy  will  be  discussed  --  the  impact  of  policy  on
the  terms  of  trade  between  foodstuffs  and  manufactured  goods.  As  far  as  the
response  of  policy  to  poverty  is  concerned,  we  consider  only  two,  although
they  are  the  most  important  two  --  social  overhead  investment  in  the  cities
and  safety  nets.  The  policy  impact  on  the  terms  of  trade  and  city  social
overhead  investment  certainly  have  a  prominant  place  in  Third  World  debate,
and  we  have  already  seen  in  Section  II  that  they  were  central  forces
influencing  the  standard  of  living  of  the  poor  on  the  expenditure  side  during
19th  century  industrial  revolutions.
Policy  Intervention  and  Price  Twist
Every  development  economist  is  acutely  aware  of  the  pro-urban  bias
embedded  in  Third  World  development  strategies  (e.g.,  Lipton,  1976),
strategies  which  are  manifested  in  particular  by  a  policy  price  twist
unfavorable  to  agriculture,  policies  which  we  think  are  detrimental  to  the
poor,  especially  where  agriculture  is  dominated  by  small,  poor,
owner-operators.  Development  economists  may  be  less  familiar  with  the  fact
-62-that  this  strategy  is  fully  consistent  with  the  past  century  or  more  of
histcotical  experience  with  industrial  revolutions.  It  is  not  idiosyncratic  to
the  Third  World,  but  rather  generic  of  most  industrial  revolutions.  If
development  analysts  were  better  acquainted  with  this  fact  of  history,  they
might  be  less  frustrated  by  their  inability  to  change  it.
In  a  recent  paper  on  modern  fiscal  redistribution,  Peter  Lindert
(1989)  has  shown  that  most  economies  undergoing  the  industrial  revolution
evolve  from  policies  which  tax  export-oriented  agriculture  to  ones  which
subsidize  it.  Symmetrically,  the  favored  treatment  of  import-competing
manufacturing  declines  with  development.  Lindert  also  shows  that  this  switch
in  policy  has  a  close  positive  correlation  with  the  other  modes  of  fiscal
redistribution  discussed  briefly  in  Section  II.  There  we  documented  an
increase  in  fiscal  progressivity  across  the  20th  century  among  the
industrialized  nations,  fiscal  trends  which  themselves  correlate  with
egalitarian  trends  in  pre-fisc  incomes  generated  in  the  marketplace.
Anti-agriculture  policies,  regressive  fiscal  policy,  and  inequality  seem  to  go
hand  in  hand  as  countries  rise  to  NIC  status  on  the  upswing  of  the  Kuznets
Curve;  they  tend  to  retreat  from  those  policies  thereafter  when  egalitarian
trends  are  set  in  motion  on  the  downside  of  the  Kuznets  Curve.
As  Lindert  points  out,  this  pattern  is  revealed  by  American  history.  In
the  first  half  of  the  19th  century,  while  America  gained  about  four  decades  of
experience  with  the  industrial  revolution,  manufacturing  received  modest
levels  of  protection.  Producers  of  export  staples  in  the  cotton  South  were
well  aware  of  the  tax  which  such  policies  implied,  but  had  the  political  clout
to  resist.  The  Civil  War  eliminated  that  clout,  and  anti-agriculture  price
twisting  policies  persisted  for  about  seven  decades  until  the  1930s.  Since
then,  agriculture  has  been  favored  not  only  by  price  supports,  but  also  by
explicit  transfers.  A similar  policy  evolution  can  be  found  in  Japan's  modern
-63-history,  although  anti-agriculture  policies  appear  somewhat  earlier  iD  her
industrialization  experience  and  take  the  form  of  direct  tazation  rather  than
of  price  twist.  This  was  certainly  true  of  Meiji  Japan,  but  farmers  were
receiving  high  levels  of  net  protection  by  tbe  late  19309,  a  trend  that
continued  into  the  post  World  War  II  period  (and  frustrates  American  export
interests  today).  The  industrial  revolutionary  experience  of  Korea  and  Taiwan
have  beein  far  more  rapid  and  thus  the  switch  in  policy  towards  agriculture  has
been  compressed  within  a  shorter  time  period,  evolving  from  policies  in  the
1950s  which  depressed  farm  prices  to  policies  in  tne  1980s  which  support  them.
Similar  tales  can  be  told  for  France  and  Germany.  Classic  industrial
protection  in  the  19th  century  began  to  erode  in  the  face  of  agricultural
interests  in  the  early  20th  century;  aggressive  net  protection  of  agriculture
arrived  in  the  1930s;  and  it  was  reinforced  with  heavy  subsidies  in  the
postwar  period.
What  about  the  leader  of  the  industrial  pack,  Britain?  Here  the  story  is
a  bit  more  complex  since  Britain  does  not  begin  her  industrial  revolution  as  a
primary  product  exporter.  Instead,  she  starts  as  a  net  importer  of  primary
products,  grains  in  particular  (or  what  she  called  "corn"),  while  exporting
manufactures.  In  this  case,  the  import-competing  sector  is  grain,  but  its
treatment  roughly  conforms  to  the  historical  law  emerging.  Namely,  the
import-competing  grain  sector  was  heavily  protected  up  to  around  1820
following  four  decades  of  industrialization;  the  level  of  protection
persisted,  but  at  lower  rates,  up  to  the  early  1840s;  the  1840s,  of  course,
form  an  historic  benchmark  since  it  was  in  1846  that  the  Corn  Laws  were
repealed,  after  which  Britain  opted  for  free  trade.  Certainly  Britain  had
reached  NIC  status  by  that  time;  indeed,  she  was  far  and  away  the  most
industrialized  country  in  the  world.
Before  we  look  at  the  impact  of  the  corn  laws  on  the  state  of  the  poor  in
-64-Britain  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution,  it  might  be  useful  to  dwell  a
moment  on  our  expectations.  On  the  incomes  side,  the  impact  on  the  poor  of  a
policy  which  diminisbes  the  terms  of  trade  facing  agriculture  cannot  be
unambiguously  assessed  until  we  know  more  about  land  ownership.  In  the
American  North,  such  a  policy  served  to  diminish  the  incomes  of  the  poor  since
there  were  so  many  small  family  farms  the  individuals  on  which  made  up  a  good
share  of  America's  poor.  In  contrast,  the  same  policy  (in  this  case,  repeal  of
the  corn  laws  in  the  1840s)  directly  affected  rich  landlords  at  the  top  of  the
distribution  in  Britain,  and  only  indirectly  affected  their  unskilled  farm
laborers.  On  the  expenditure  side,  the  poor,  especially  the  urban  poor,  were
beavy  consumers  of  the  foodstuffs  and  thus  gained  by  the  diminisbed  domestic
terms  of  trade.  Thus,  the  impact  of  the  same  terms  of  trade  policy  in  the  two
countries  was  likely  to  have  quite  different  effects  on  the  poor.
So  what  was  the  impact  of  the  Corn  Laws  during  the  First  Industrial
Revolution  w6un  inequality  was  on  the  rise,  and  when  living  standards  of  the
poor  were  lagging  behind?  The  debates  from  1815  to  1846  always  pose  -hese
issues  in  distributional  terms.  The  Anti-Corn  Law  League  made  it  absolutely
clear  who  gained  and  who  lost.  Landlords,  at  the  very  top  of  the  income
pyramid,  gained  from  high  rents.  Capitalists  in  manufacturing,  somewhere  in
the  middle  of  the  income  pyramid,  suffered  since  they  had  to  pay  higher
nominal  wages,  their  export  trade  was  repressed,  and  their  profits  were  choked
off.  Closer  to  the  bottom  of  the  income  pyramid,  the  real  wage  of  urban
workers  suffered  from  the  "bread  tax".  The  impact  on  the  poorest  of  the
working  poor,  rural  farm  laborers,  was  less  clear  since  the  employment.  impact
and  the  cost  of  living  impact  were  offsetting.  The  same  ambiguity  applied  to
all  workers  in  the  bottom  40%.  Debate  over  these  magnitudes  has  been  going  on
now  for  a  century  and  a  half.
General  equilibrium  imodels  are  clearly  the  best  way  to  assess  the  Corn
-65-Laws  or any  other  price  twist  policy  associated  witb early  industrial
revolutions.  When  a five-sector,  open-economy  model  is applied  to  Britain  in
the  1830s  we get  some  striking  answers  (Williamson,  1986b).  Table  21 estimates
the  impact  of the  Corn  Laws  where  Ricardo's  small  country  assumption  is
invoked.  That is,  the  domestic  price  of tradables  is  determined  exogenously  by
world  market  conditions  and  British  tariff  policy.  The counterfactual  supposes
that  the  Repeal  was  passed  in the  mid 1830s  so that  the  54%  tariff  on grains
is removed  all  at once.  World  market  conditions,  domestic  endowments,  and
technologies  are  all  held constant.
What  would  have been  the  impact  of an early  Repeal  and  the  elimination  of
the  price  twist?  Table  21 estimates  that  21%  of the  labor  force  would  have
fled  agriculture  in response  to  deteriorating  employment  conditions  induced  by
an early  Repeal.  This  is clearly  a large  figure,  implying  that  about  a fifth
of the  agricultural  labor  force  would  have  been  made  redundant  by a  movement
towards  free  tr.  in the  1830s The Anti-Corn  Law  League  argued  that  the
tariffs  choked  off the  supply  of labor  to  manufacturing,  that  the  Corn  Laws
served  to suppress  the  export  of  manufactures,  and  thus  that  actual
industrialization  (and  thus  job  creation)  was  slower  that  it  would  have been
under  free  trade.  An early  Repeal,  they  argued,  woule  have  served  to augment
the  supply  of labor  to  manufacturing,  to stimulate  exports,  and  to  boost  the
rate  of industrialization.  According  to the  Ricardian  small  country  model,  it
appears  that  the  League  was  absolutely  correct.
But  who  gained  and  who  lost  from  Repeal  of the  Corn  Laws?  Certainly
landlords  and  tenant  farmers  lost  a  great  deal.  Table  21 estimates  that  the
agricultural  rents  would  have been  cut  by 20%  by an early  Repeal  in the  1830s.
Who  would  have gained?  The  average  Briton  would  have  gained  very  little:  early
Repeal  would  have  removed  the  deadweight  losses  associated  with  the  tariffs,
but  the  gain  in real  GNP  per  capita  would  have  been  no more  than  2%.  Like  mostHarberger  Triangle  calculations,  this  figure  is very  small.  No wonder  the
debate  over  the  Corn  Laws  ignored  aggregate  income  effects.  Distributional
issues  we,e  more  central.
Table  21 suggests  that  common  labor  had a  great  deal  at stake  in the
debate  since  the  positive  effects  of removal  of the  "bread  tax"  would  have
swamped  the  negative  employment  effects.  The  net  effect  of an early  Repeal  in
the  1830s  would  have  been  to raise  unskilled  real  wages  by about  23%.  If this
estimate  is even  close  to the  mark,  it suggests  that  the  Corn  Laws  help
explain  why  common  labor's  standard  of living  lagged  behind  in the  first  half
of the  19th  century.  The  Corn  Laws  also  appear  to have  squeezed  the
distribution  in the  middle  a  bit. That  is,  capitalists  in  m,Aufacturing
suffered  modestly.  Opponents  of the  Corn  Laws  believed  that  it was  laborers
and  capitalists  who were  paying  the  subsidy  to  grain  producers,  but  it appears
to have  been  mostly  the  former.  It  follows  that  a good  share  of the  rising
inequality  and  lagging  living  standards  of the  poor  during  the  First
Industrial  Revolution  may  be attributable  to the  Corn  Laws.  It  may also
explain  why  poor  relief  was  relatively  generous  up to the  1830s,  and  why it
was  oriented  towards  farm  laborers  in the  South  of England.
All  of this  analysis  assumes  with  Ricardo  that  the  external  terms  of
trade  was  unaffected  by Britain's  tariff  policy.  Torrens  disagreed.  He thought
the  tariff  improved  the  external  terms  of trade  enough  to  overturn  these
results.  However,  when  the  model  is expanded  to include  Torrens'  position,
unskilled  labor  at the  bottom  of the  distribution  still  suffer  under  the  Corn
Laws.
Allocation  of Public  Goods:  Social  Overhead  in the  Cities
At the  conclusion  of Section  I1,  we showed  that  urban  rerts  rose
-67-dramatically  across  the  industrial  revolution  and  that this  had  especially
damaging  effects  on the  urban  poor  by raising  their  living  costs.  They  made  an
effort  to  economize  on the  more  expensive  housing  by crowding  into  very
densely-packed  districts.  At the  same  time,  municipal  authorities  and  planners
found  it extremely  difficult  to  cope  with  the  pollution  and  disamenities
generated  by the  crowding  in these  rapidly  growing  cities.  Thus,  the  cities
became  serious  health  hazards,  so  much  so that  Frederick  Engels  called  them
"killers".  Indeed,  the  mortality  rate  was  far  higher  in the  cities  than  in the
coutryside  during  19th  century  industrial  revolutions.  In contrast,  today's
cities  in the  Third  World  are relatively  benign  since,  if anytbing,  mortality
rates  are  higher  in the  countryside.  Not  so in the  19th  century,  as Table  7
shows  for  England  (and  things  were  no different  on the  Continent  or in
America).  The  death  and  sickness  asso)ciated  with  this  ugly enviroment  fell
most  heavily,  of course,  on the  poor  and the  extreme  poor,  those  worst
equipped  to escape  the  environment.  Sickness,  mortality  and  poverty  are,  of
course,  highly  correlated,  but  how  much of this  result  was  simply  due  to a
fact  of policy,  namely  to  underinvest  in  the  social  overhead  of the  cities?  A
very  large  literature  suggests  that  a good  sbare  of it can  be attributable  to
this  policy  of neglect,  for  which  the  urban  poor  had  to suffer.
Let  us begin  with  what  may  appear  to be an extraneous  observation,
altbough  we think  it is  central  to the  story.  By the  standards  of the
contemporary  Third  World  and  the  late 19th  century,  Britain  recorded  very
modest  investment  sbares  in national  income.  That  fact  has  generated  a long
and  active  debate  centered  around  the  question:  Was  the  investment  share  low
because  investment  requirements  were  modest,  or was  the investment  share  low
because  of a savings  constraint?  The  first  argues  that  investment  demand  in
the  private  sector  was the  critical  force  driving  accumulation  during
Britain's  industrial  revolution,  low  rates  of technical  progress  and  an
-68-absence  of a capital-using  bias  both serving  to  minimize  private  sector
investment  requirements.  The  second  argues  that  Britain's  growth  was
savings-constrained.  Until -ry recently,  the  first  view  has  dominated  the
literature.
This  dominant  view  sees  early  19th  century  Britain  as so labor-intensive
that  investment  requirements  to equip  new  workers  could  be easily  fulfilled  by
modest  amounts  of domestic  savings,  so easily  in fact  that  domestic  savings
had to  look  for  outlets  overseas.  Thus,  David  Landes  (1969,  pp.  78-79)  brushes
problems  of accumulation  aside  with  one  magisterial  sweep,  leaving  him  free to
deal  with  technology  and  private  sector  entrepreneurship  in the  remaining  550
pages  of The  Unbound  Prometheus:
...  however  justified  this  concern  with  saving  and  capital  may  be in
this  age  of costly  equipment  and  facilities  [in]  abysmally  poor
would-be  industrial  economies,  it is  less  relevant  to the  British
experience  ...  the  capital  requirements  of these  early  innovations
were small...
Phyllis  Deane  and W.  A. Cole (1962,  p. 277)  and  Peter  Nathias  (1972,  p. viii)
agree.  According  to Deane,  Cole,  Landes  and  Nathias,  the  explanation  for  the
modest  investment  requirements  during  the  British  industrial  revolution  lies
with  simple  labor-intensive  technologies,  capital-saving  innovations,
capital-stretching  and  intelligent  exploitation  of excess  capacity.
Contemporary  World  Bank  analysts  would  find  this  interpretation  attractive
since  they  could  use it to  support  their  critique  of Third  World  economies
which,  it is argued,  often  adopt  inefficient  capital-intensive  development
strategies  during  their  ongoing  industrial  revolutions,  diminishing  job
creation,  and  thus  hurting  the  poor.
-69-Where  does this  benign  modest-investment-requirements  view  come
from?  The  tradition  starts  in the  1930s  with  two  very  influential  papers  by
Michael  Postan (1935)  and  Herbert  Heaton  (1937),  the  latter  the  source  of the
statement  that the  initial  capital  requirements  during  the  industrial
retolution  were  "modest".  It turns  out,  however,  that  Postan  and  Heaton
restricted  their  attention  to the  direct  investment  requirements  of factory
production.  They  ignored  the  indirect  public  sector  infrastructure
requirements,  city social  overhead  in  particular.  This  very  narrow  window  on
the  industrial  revolution  tends  to blur  their  vision.  Indeed,  in the  fifty
years  since  Postan  wrote  his  paper,  rarely  do we hear  any  mention  of housing,
infrastructure  and  social  overhead.  This  is surely  a puzzling  attribute  of the
accumulation  debate  since  there  is anotber  strand  of historical  literature
which  stresses  crowding  in the  cities,  a deteriorating  urban  environment,  and
lack  of  public  investment  in infrastructure  (sewers,  water  supplies,  street
paving,  lighting,  refuse  removal,  and  so on).  It is also  puzzling  since  we
have  come  to learn  just  how large  such investments  loom  in typical  industrial
revolutions,  the  Third  World  included.  Indeed,  many development  economists  and
historians  bave argued  that  such  investments  are  essential  complements  to the
plant  and  equipment  set  in place  in modern  industry.  Without  them,  rates  of
return  in the  modern  private  sector  may sag  and  industrialization  can  be
choked  off.  Dirty  and  unhealthy  cities  can  serve  to drive  up the  effective
price  of labor  to urban  firms  either  by producing  sick  workers  or  by requiring
large  nomijal  wage  bribes  to get  reluctant  workers  to enter  the  dirty  cities.
Both  would  serve  to raise  the  effective  cost  of labor,  choking  off industrial
profits,  accumulation,  and  job  creation.
Cecond,  and  more important,  the  literature  has  confused  what  actually  was
with  what should  have been.  It  may  be a mistake  to conclude  that  Britain's
labor-intensive  growth  strategy  was  a Good  Thing.  Heaton's  "modest"  investment
-70-requirements  may  reflect  an attempt  to achieve  an industrial  revolution  on the
cheap.  If so,  the  strategy  may  have turned  out to  be more  expensive  in the
longer  run.
If investment  requirements  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution  were
really  modest,  it should  have  been  reflected  in relatively  low  capital-output
ratios.  Table  22 collects  the  evidence  for  Britain  1800-1860  and  for  a number
of industrial  revolutions  that  have followed  in  the  wake  of the  First.  While
we have  the  ingredients  necessary  to calculate  both  average  capital-output
ratios  (ACOR)  and  incremental  capital-output  ratios  (ICOR),  the  late  19th and
20th  century  estimates  are  limited  to ICORs  only.  Furthermore,  all  of the
figures  in  Table  22 are  for  fixed  capital.
Panel  A offers  provisional  support  for  the  modest-investment-requirements
view:  Britain's  ACOR  underwent  a spectacular  drop  from  5.21  in 1800  to 3.55  in
1860,  the  biggest  fall  by far  taking  place  in the  first  three  decades  of the
19th  century.  No diminishing  returns  to capital,  it appears.  Or if there  was
diminishing  returns,  it  was  dominated  by capital-saving  technical  change  (von
Tunzlemann,  1981,  pp.  160-161).  At the  margin,  therefore,  Britain's  investment
requirements  during  the  industrial  revolution  were  far  below  18th  century
averages.  Indeed,  the  economy-wide  ICOR  up to 1830  was  only  2.65,  far  below
Simon  Kuznets'  ten-country  average  for  the  1950s (Panel  B),  and  even  below
that  for  low-income  countries  in  the 1950s  and  Meiji  Japan (the  latter  viewed
by  most analysts  to  have  been  the  classic  example  of capital-saving
development).
In this  sense,  Deane,  Cole,  Landes  and  Nathias  are  correct:  Britain's
investment  requirements  on the  margin  were  modest  during  the  industrial
revolution,  and  they  stay  modest  well  into  the  late  19th  century.  However,  we
believe  the  inferences  which  they  draw from  that  observation  are  incorrect.
First,  the  case  for  .itain's  unique  "modesty"  of investment  requiremerts
-71-has  been  overdrawn.  Britain's  ICOR  during  the  first  half of the  19th  century
was  3.1 (Panel  A, total,  1800-1860),  above  the  2.9  figure  for  Meiji  Japan  and
not  far  below  the  3.4  figure  for  low-income  countries  in  the 1950s  (Panel  B).
Furthermore,  there  is no  evidence  that  Britain's  ICOR  in  manufacturing  was  any
different  from  that  of the  contemporary  developing  countries.  While  Britain's
ICOR  was  low, to  describe  her investment  requirements  as "ashtonishingly
small"  (Mathias,  1972,  p. viii)  and concern  with  saving  and  capital  "less
relevant"  (Landes,  1969,  p. 78)  compared  to  many  poor  developing  countries
today  is, to  say  the  least,  overstating  the  case.
Second,  one  of the  key  reasons  why investment  requirements  during  the
First  Industrial  Revolution  were so modest  is that  Britain  failed  to  commit
resources  to those  urban  investment  activites  which,  in Landes'  (1969,  p. 78)
words,  make industrialization  such  a costly  venture  today,  and  which,  in  W.
Arthur  Lewis'  (1978,  p. 29)  words,  make contemporary  Third  World  cities  so
capital-intensive.  Investment  in  housing  and  public  works  simply  failed  to
keep  pace  with  the  rest  of Britain's  economy  in  the  first  half  of the  19th
century.  One  can  see .his  very  clearly  in Panel  A of Table  22.  While  the  total
ACOR  drops  precipitously  between  1800  and  1860,  the  ACOR for  the  total  economny
less  agriculture,  housing  and  public  works  actually  rises  over  the  same
period.  While  the  ACOR  outside  of agriculture  does fall,  implying  low  ICORs
and  modest  investment  requirements  at the  margin,  the  reason  for  it is that
capital-intensive  housing  and  public  works  were  given  short  shrift.
Another  way of illustrating  this  point  is to examine  the  behavior  of
capital  stock  growth  in  social  overhead  --  residential  housing  plus  public
works  and  public  buildings.  Table  23  documents  per  annum  growth  rates  in
capital  stocks  per  capita  (1851-1860  prices).  The  table's  message  _s clear.
Investment  requirements  durinlg  the  late 18th  century  were  kept  modest  simply
by allowing  the  stock  of social  overhead  per  capita  to fall,  contributing,
-72-presumably,  to a deterioration  in the  quality  of life  for  the  poor,  an item
which  usually  is excluded  from  conventional  measures  of output.  This  growth
strategy  continued  for  tbe  first  three  decades  of the  19th  century,  although
not  with  quite  the  same  intensity.  Per capita  stocks  in public  works  continued
to  decline,  but  dwelling  stocks  per  capita  began  to rise.  The latter  did  not
rise  enough,  however,  to regain  the  levels  of 1760.  By 1830,  therefore,
Britain  had  accumulated  an enormous  deficit  in  her  social  overhead  stocks  by
pursuing  seventy  years  of industrialization  on the  cheap.  It cost  her dearly,
as the  social  reformers  were about  to  point  out.  Between  1830  and  1860,  there
is some  evidence  of catching  up in  public  works  --  in ;art  a response  to the
goading  of the  social  reformers,  but the  gap in  growth  rates  between  dwelling
stocks  and  all  other  fixed  capital  per  capita  increased.
All  of this  suggests  that  while  actual  investment  requirements  may  have
been  modest  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution,  they  would  not  have  been
so  modest  had investment  in social  overhead  kept  pace.  In fact,  had social
overhead  investment  kept  up  with all  other  investment  after  1800  --  let alone
making  good  on accumulated  past  deficits --  the  ICOR  over  the  first  half of
the  19th  century  would  have  been in excess  of 4, not  the  "modest"'  3.1  actually
achieved.
The  argument  could  be sharpened  if  we could  identify  which  of the
investment  and  capital  stock  estimates  were  city-specific.  Then  we could  talk
more explicitly  in terms  of underinvestment  in city  social  overhead.  With some
plausible  assumptions,  it appears  that  we can.  Before  the  evidence  from  the
First  Industrial  Revolution  is explored,  consider  20th  century  industrial
revolutions.  V. Arthur  Lewis  speaks  to this  issue  with authority:
Urbanisation  is decisive  because  it is so  expensive.  The
difference  between  the  cost  of urban  and  rural  development
-73-does  not turn  on comparing  the  capital  required  for  factories
and  that  required  for  farms.  Each  of these  is a small  part  of total
investment,  and  the  difference  per  head  is  not always  in favor  of
industry.  The  difference  turns  on infrastructure  (Lewis,  1978,  p.
29).
Indeed,  when social  overhead  (including  dwellings)  is added  to  direct  capital
requirements,  the  capital-labor  ratio  in India's  cities  is  about  4.5  times
that  of her rural  areas  (Becker,  Mills  and  Williamson,  forthcoming,  Table
3.1).  Similar  findings  are  reported  by Lipton  (1976,  Table  7.1,  pp.  442-443).
While  Third  World  are  very  capital-intensive,  Table  24 shows  that
Britain's  cit.-es  in the  early  19th  century  were  not.  Three  estimates  of the
capital-labor  ratio  are  reported  in the  table.  The  first  is limited  to direct
fixed  capital  only.  Capital-labor  ratios  were  generally  lower  in
non-agriculture  in the  first  three  decades  of the  19th century,  and  they  began
to  exceed  agriculture  only  after  the  1830s.  Even  in the  1850s,  however,
capital-labor  ratios  were  not  much  higher  in non-agriculture.  The  second  adds
housing  to direct  fixed  capital.  The third  adds  the  remaining  social
overhead.  In  sharp  rontrast  to Lewis's  characterization  of the  Third  World,
when  social  overhead  is included  Britain's  cities  look  no  more capital
intensive  compared  with  the  countryside  then  when the  social  overhead  is
excluded.  While  urban  capital-labor  ratios  are  about  4.5  times  rural  in India,
they  were  about  the  same  or less  in mid  19th  century  Britain.
Cities  are  very  capital-intensive  in the  contemporary  Third  World.  Cities
were  relatively  labor-intensive  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution.  The
difference  appears  to be explained  in large  part  by a remarkably  weak
cjommitment  to city  social  overhead  in  Britain.
City  social  overhead  was low  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution.  It
-74-lowered  investment  requirements,  perhaps  freeing  up  resources  for  consumption
of  foodstuffs  and  other  essential  commodities.  But  it  had  its  price  since  the
cities  became  ugly,  crowd6d  and  polluted,  breeding  high  uottality  and
morbidity  especially  among  the  poor.  In  sharp  contrast  with  the  contemporary
Third  World,  and  to  repeat,  Britain's  cities  were  killers:  in  1841,  city
mortality  rates  were  5.6  per  thousand  higher  than  in  the  countryside
(Williamson,  forthcoming,  Table  2.1);  in  1960,  Third  World  cities  had
mortality  rates  that  were  6.3  per  thousand  lower  than  the  countryside  (Rogers,
1984,  p.  288).  We  simply  do  not  know  how  much  of  this  stark  demographic
contrast  between  1841  Britain  and  the  contemporary  Third  World  is  due  to
Britain's  low  investment  in  city  social  overhead.  Nor  are  we  certain  what
contribution  low  investment  in  city  social  overhead  made  to  the  observed  lag
of  life  expectancy  behind  GNP  gains  (Fogel,  1986).  But  surely  it  mattered.
Evidence  such  as  this  invites  the  inference  that  more  and  earlier
investment  in  city  social  overhead  would  have  lowered  mortality  and  morbidity,
while  raising  the  quality  of  life.  But  what  would  it  have  cost?  Would  it  have
been  a  Good  Thing?  Was  low  investment  in  city  social  overbead  necessarily
evidence  of  underinvestment?  The  low  investment  could  have  been  due  to  any  one
of  the  following  forces,  and  they  have  quite  different  implications:
investment  demand  for  city  social  overhead  may  have  been  low  because  public
health  technologies  were  primitive,  or  because  urban  poverty  bred  low  demand
for  housing;  investment  demand  for  city  social  overhead  may  have  been  low
because  of  some  capital  market  failure;  investment  demand  for  city  social
overhead  may  have  been  low  because  of  some  public  sector  failure;  and
investment  in  city  social  overhead  may  have  been  low  due  to  savings
constraints  and  crowding  out  by  other  projects  (including  those  abroad).  It
isn't  obvious  which  of  these  forces  accounts  for  Britain's  low  investment
commitment  to  city  social  overhead.
-75-Thus,  we  have  no  shortage  of  explanations  for  the  low  commitment  to  city
social  overhead  investment  during  the  First  Industrial  Revolution.  But  if
Britain  underinvested  in  city  social  overhead,  then  ws should  see  it  in  the
form  of  high  social  rates  of  return  to  such  investment.  Reformists  of  that
time  certainly  made  the  case  that  the  cities  were  crowded  and  filthy,  and  that
sickness  and  death  were  highly  correlated  with  city  ugliness,  but  to  clinch
the  case  for  public  intervention  the  reformers  had  to  show  clearly  that  public
health  investment  would  yield  favorable  returns  as  well  as  to  show  which
projects  should  have  been  favored  first.  The  reformers  could  not  show  this  in
1842  and  modern  historians  have  difficulty  showing  it  today.  Indeed,  we  are
not  even  sure  what  was  driving  mortality  trends  across  the  19th  century,
including  the  contribution  of  sanitary  reform  to  those  trends.  Nonetheiess,  we
do  have  some  suggestive  hints.
Thomas  NcKeown  (McKeown,  1976;  NcKeown  and  Record,  1962)  guessed  that
public  health  investments  introduced  by  the  sanitary  reformers  accounted  for
about  a  quarter  of  the  mortality  decline  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth
century,  but  even  that  brilliant  guess  has  been  challenged  in  subsequent
debate.  As  Fogel  (1986,  Table  9.1,  p.  440)  has  recently  shown,  the  British
standardized  death  rate  declined  by  21  points  between  1700  and  1980,  from  28
per  thousand  to  7  per  thousand,  about  half  of  which  took  place  before  1911,
and  a  third  in  the  six  decades  following  1850.  NcKeown  argued  that  improved
nutriticn  and  sanitation  investment  were  the  principal  factors  accounting  for
the  decline,  especially  the  former  (another  key  wage  good  for  the  poor  which
was  rising  in  relative  price  prior  to  the  late  1840s,  as  we  have  seen).  In
fact,  NcKeown  and  Record  (1962,  p.  120)  suggested  that  in  the  second  half  of
the  19th  century  investment  in  public  health  accounted  for  about  a  quarter  of
the  decline  while  the  rise  in  nutrition  accounted  for  about  half.  Decrowding
explained  none  of  the  decline,  since  it  failed  to  take  place.
-76-If the  impact  of public  health  investment  was  modest,  was it  due  to
inadaquate  investment,  or to a weak  impact  of  public  health  investment  on
mortality,  or both?  We favor  the  first  hypothesis. That  conclusion  is based
in  part  on the  evidence  that  18th  century  public  health  environmental  efforts
had  recorded  considerable  success  in  reducing  English  mortality.  The
conclusion  is  also based  in  part  on Nichael  Flinn's  (1965,  p. 52)  observation
that  reformers  thought  that  French  public  health  practice  was  in advance  of
the  British  at the  time  of the  Sanitary  Report. Perhaps  more  to the  point,  as
with  Riley's  (1987)  18th  century  English  evidence,  work  by Samuel  Preston  and
Etienne  van  de Valle (1978)  suggests  that  water  and  sewage  improvements  played
an important  role  in 19th  century  French  urban  mortality  declines.  These  were
concentrated  among  the  water-borne  diseases,  but  they think  that  cleaning  up
French  cities  may  have  lowered  death  rates  by air-borne  disease  too  since
sanitation  investments  improved  nutritional  status  (Preston  and  van  de Walle,
1978,  p. 288).  Thus,  they  conclude  that  "water  support  rather  than  food
support  systems  are  the  key  to understanding  trends  in urban  French  mortality"
(Preston  and  van  de Walle,  1978,  p. 284),  quite  in contrast  with  McKeown's
characterization  of 19th  century  Britain.  In another  paper,  Preston  and  Verne
Nelson  have  shown  that  the  mortality  changes  in late  19th  century  Britain  were
quite  unusual  based  on the  "normal"  cause  of death  patterns  among  48 nations
betweenl  1861  and  1964,  the  high share  attributed  to  tuberculosis  in  particular
(Prestcn  and  Nelson,  1974,  p. 24).
In 1985,  Preston  offered  one  more  piece  of evidence  which  suggests  that
McKeown  has exaggerated  the  role  of nutritional  intake  and  living  standards,
and,  by inference,  understated  the  potential  impact  of public  health.  Preston
estimated  the  relationship  between  per  capita  income  and life  expectancy  for
the  1960s  and  the  1930s,  comparing  each  with limited  observations  on the
1900s.  Across  the  20th  century  at least,  income  per  capita  (standard  of living
-77-or  nutrition  intake;  improvements  can  explain  at  most  a  quarter  of  the  rise  in
life  expectancy,  encouraging  the  view  that  omitted  variables  --  like  the  rise
in  public  health  investment  --  can  account  for  at  least  three  quarters.  Figure
12  reproduces  Preston's  exercise  for  what  we  believe  is  an  improved  data  set,
and  one  which  is  augmented  with  mid  19th  century  observations  as  well.  The
upward  drift  in  the  relationship  is  fully  consistent  with  Preston's  fir.dings,
namely  a  much  larger  share  of  the  rise  in  life  expectancy  from  the  mid  19th
century  onwards  is  due  to  factors  uncorrelated  with  per  capita  'ncome,  among
them,  of  course,  the  rise  in  public  health.
What  was  the  social  rate  of  return  to  investment  in  public  health  and
cleaning  up  the  cities?  A  decade  or  so  ago,  Edward  Meeker  (1974)  used
conventional  benefit/cost  analysis  to  estimate  tte  social  rate  of  return  to
investment  in  public  health  in  American  cities  between  1880  and  1910,  getting
a  range  between  6%  and  16%.  Both  of  these  social  rates  of  return  exceed
private  market  rates  at  that  time,  and  Meeker  concluded  that  investment  in
public  health  and  city  social  overhead  was  sound.  It  also  implies,  of  course,
that  there  was  gross  underinvestment  in  these  activities  even  late  in  the
century.  It  seems  likely  that  it  was  even  higher  early  in  the  century  in
Britain's  cities.  But  if  the  social  rate  of  return  on  investment  in  city
social  overhead  was  so  high  in  the  1830s  and  1840s,  why  was  the  level  of
investment  so  low?  We  have  been  persuaded  by  Anthony  Wohl  (1983)  that  the
explanation  lies  with  failure  of  two  kinds  --  capital  market  failure  and
public  sector  failure.
The  capital  market  failure  hypothesis  is  motivated  by  the  evidence  that
until  the  pasaage  of  various  municipal  acts  over  the  three  decades  following
1835,  most  cities  in  England  found  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  secure
Ivng  term  finance  for  social  overhead  investments.  However,  the  fact  that
cities  were  investing  so  little  in  social  overhead  is  not  enough  evidence  to
-78-support  the  capital  market  failure  hypothesis  since  low  demand  may  have  been
the  source.  The  public  sector  failure  hypothesis  is  even  more  appealing,  and
recent  work  on  German  late  19th  century  experience  with  sanitation  investment
tends  to  support  Wohl's  view  (Brown,  1988a,  1988b).
In  the  second  half  of  the  century,  there  were  over  1,000  sanitary
districts  in  England  and  Vales,  but  neither  the  1835  Municipal  Corporations
Act  nor  the  1848  Public  Health  Act  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  local
groups  responsible  for  health  matters.  Municipal  franchise  was  based  on
rateable  values,  so  the  electorate  was  very  narrow.  In  1861,  only  3  percent  of
the  population  of  Birmingham  could  vote  for  members  of  the  town  council  (and
thus  influence  sanitary  investment  decisions),  while  the  figure  for  Leeds  was
13  percent.  A  survey  taken  in  1886  of  about  a  fifth  of  the  sanitary  districts
revealed  that  those  administering  the  public  health  acts  were  mainly
shopkeepers  (30.8  percent  of  local  sanitary  officials),  followed  by
manufacturers  (17.5  percent),  gentlemen  (11.8  percent),  merchants  (8.6
percent),  farmers  (7.7  percent)  and  builders  (7.6  percent).  Most  of  these,
especially  shopkeepers  and  polluting  manufacturers,  stood  to  gain  from  low
rates,  and  this  was  the  main  source  of  town  revenues.
While  the  greatest  opposition  to  the  sanitary  reforms  marched  under  the
banner  of  "Economy",  the  word  was  clearly  misplaced.  "Opposition  to  Unfair
Taxes"  would  have  been  a  more  accurate  banner.  According  to  this  view,  the
public  failure  lay  with  an  inefficient  and  unjust  tax  system.  Taxes  were
assessed  on  the  rental  value  of  property,  and  "thus  a  man  whose  sole  income
was  derived  from  rents  paid  much  higher  rates  in  proportion  to  his  total
income  than  others"  (Wohl,  1983,  p.  171).  No  wonder  "the  economists"  were
hostile  to  sanitary  improveaents.  No  wonder  there  was  underinvestment  in  city
social  overhead.
Two  important  developments  began  to  overcome  tnis  impass  in  the  1860s,
-79-although  a  three  decade  lag  implied  enormous  social  losses  due  to  the  public
sector  failure.  The  first  was  general  economic  growth  in  the  cities  which
served  to  augment  the  local  tax  base,  and  thus  lower  the  effective  tax  rate.
The  second  was  more  interventionist  and  the  result  of  central  government
action;  subsidized  terms  on  loans  fcr  town  improvements  from  the  central
government.  In  the  absence  of  tax  reform  at  the  local  level,  what  the  central
government  loan  subsidies  served  to  do  was  to  distribute  the  tax  burden  more
equally.  It  served,  therefore,  to  create  a  better  matcb  between  those  who
gained  from  cleaning  up  Britain's  cities  and  those  who  paid.
What  about  housing?  From  the  social  reform  debates  of  the .830s  and  1840s
to  the  early  20th  century,  overcrowding  in  Britain's  cities  has  received  much
attention.  The  pessimists  in  the  standard  of  living  debate  felt  certain  that
overcrowding  in  tenaments  and  cottages  was  at  the  beart  of  bigh  morbidity  and
mortality  in  the  cities,  and  that  things  bad  gotten  worse  from  the  1790s  to
the  1840s.  The  issue  was  sufficiently  important  that  overcrowding  was
highlighted  in  the  1842  Sanitary  Report  and  in  the  1844  Report  of  Larue  Towns.
It  was  also  central  to  the  1885  Royal  Commission  on  the  Rousing  of  the  Working
Classes,  indicating  that  little  progress  had  been  made  on  the  problem  over  the
four  decades  from  the  1840s  to  the  1880s.  Nor  had  the  problem  disappeared  by
the  turn  of  the  century.  Indeed,  the  immense  empirical  inquiry  of  the  Board  of
Trade  into  town  cost  of  living  in  1905  w4s motivated  primarily  by  high  rents,
housing  scarcity,  crowding  and  its  impliciations  on  the  health  of  the  poor.
In  short,  qualitative  reports  such  as  these  suggest  that  Britain  had  made
little  or  no  progress  on  decrowding  in  her  cities  from  the  French  Wars  to
World  World  I.
Modern  revisionists  have  shown  that  it  is  simply  not  enougb  to  point  to
various  manifestations  of  poverty  in  making  assessments  of  Anglo-American
treatment  of  their  poor.  Nor  is  it  enough  to  point  to  rapid  industrialization
-80-to  conclude  that  either  of  these  two  were  countries  to  emulate.  Rapid
industrialization  may  have  been  either  too  rapid  or  not  rapid  enough.  To  prove
the  case  that  Britain  or  America  failed,  we  have  to  show  that  things  could
have  been  better  with  more  intelligent  policy  and  more  efficient  institutions.
The  same  holds  for  European  and  American  cities  during  the  industrial
revolution.  It  is  not  enough  to  document  high  city  mortality,  morbidity,
ugliness,  pollution,  and  crowding.  We  have  to  show  that  things  would  have  been
better  in  countries  like  Britain  had  authorities  pursued  more  intelligent
policy  and  developed  more  efficient  institut.  is.  While  our  intuition  may
support  the  view  of  underinvestment  in  19th  century  cities,  finding  the
evidence  of  failure  is  a  tougher  task.
-81-Safety  Nets,  the  Family,  and the  State
Safety  nets  obviously  matter  to the  poor.  By safety  nets,  we mean  those
resources  provided  by the  family,  the  community,  or the  state  that  support
individuals  during  times  of economic  crisis.  Vithout  these  safety  nets,
fluctuations  in the  incomes  of the  poor (or  in  their  consumption  capacity)
will  lead  to  high mortality  and  social  disruption.  There  is  a commonly  held
myth about  the  historical  evolution  of safety  nets.  The  myth  has two  parts.
First,  and  during  early  stages  of  modern  economic  growth,  industrialization
and  the  emergence  of  markets  both  undermine  a traditional  agrarian  society
wherein  the  poor,  the  sick,  and  the  old  were  all  suprorted  by extended
families  and  the  local  village  community That  is,  in the  traditional  society
the  state  p.iyed  no active  role.  Second,  and  late  in the  industrialization
process,  formal  institutions  like  social  security  are  invented  by modern
governments  which 'finally)  replace  the  traditional  functions  of family  and
charity  in caring  for  the  poor.  In  between  these  two  stages  lies  an
intermediate  phase  of development  in  which  the  dependence
on the  market  increases  sharply  (given  t e  breakdown  of the
traditional  peasant  economy)  and  in which  guaranteed  entitlements
in the  form  of social  security  benefits  have  yet to  emerge  (Sen,
1977,  p. 56).
Some  support  for  the  existence  of the  second  stage  of this  mythical
evolution  of safety  nets  is  provided  by Lindert's  (1989)  recent  analysis  of
state-induced  post-fist-  redistributions,  the  key  examples  heing  the  rise  of
20th  century  welfare  programs  in  Europe  and  North  America.  Lindert  sees  two
forces  driving  this  event.  One is the  emergence  of mass  democracies  with  broad
-82-political  base.  The  other  is the  changing  position  of large  median  groups
within  the  income  distribution.  Early  20th  century  Europe  and  America,  argues
Lindert,  saw  these  large  enfranchised  groups  nearer  the  poor  end  of the  income
distribution  and  much  more likely  to fall  down  thap  climb  up.  Hence,  their
support  for  welfare  policies  generous  to the  poor  and  hard on the  rich.
There  is some  truth  to  Lindert's  story.  Certainly  the  first  two  thirds  of
this  century  has seen  an increase  in state  support  of the  poor.  but  this  is
only  half  the  story.  If  we accept  the  myth  of a simple  two  stage  path  from
"traditional"  to "modern"  safety  nets,  we will  miss a key  lesson  of history.
Thu  first  big  error  embedded  in the  myth  is its  romanticized  image  of
traditional  society.  The  considerable  efforts  of  demographic  historians  over
the  past  three  decades  has  made it  clear  that  extended  family  systems  were
never  the  norm  in  Northwestern  Europe  (Hajnal,  1982),  where,  after  all,  the
industrial  revolution  began.  Far from  undermining  the  extended  family,
industrialization  may actually  have  strengthened  it.  Michael  Anderson's  (1972)
studies  of 19th  century  Lancashire  found  more  old  people  living  with their
married  children  in industrial  Preston  than  in  nearby  rural  areas.  The  same
has  been  found  in industrializing  Massachusetts  in the  19th  century  (Harevin
and  Chudacoff,  l9xx).  Other  studies  of  household  structure  may  not  provide  a
clear  verdict  on whether  the  extended  family  increased  or decreased  during  the
19th  century  (for  example  Wall,  1984),  but  they  do make it  clear  that  the
family  was  not the  typical  safety  nor.  in pre-industrial  Britain.  Such  a
finding  is  hardly  surprising.  Most  parents  didn't  live  long  enough  to be a
burden  on their  children  anyway.  As mortality  rates  fell  during  the  industrial
revolution,  parents  lived  longer,  giving  them  a  greater  opportunity  to be
supported  by their  children  in old  age.  And  t' ir  children,  enjoying  higher
incomes,  were  better  equipped  to support  them.  On the  other  hand,  children
could  bette-  escape  those  re3ponsibilities  and  default  on their  parents'
-83-investment  in them  by migrating  to labor  markets  in distant  towns  at  home  or
abroad  (Williamson,  1986a).
There  was,  however,  a safety  net  in pre-industrial  Britain  and  America
that  was threatened  by 19th  century  industrialization  in  both countries,  and
it  was  provided  by --  much  to the  surprise,  we suspect,  of many  readers  who
have  been  victims  of the  myth  --  the  state.  From  the  17th  to the  19th  century,
"the  co)lectivity  rather  than  the  family  was the  source  of security  for  the
individual  over the  life  course"  (Laslett,  1985,  p. 360).  The text  of the
famous  Elizabethan  Poor  Law  Act  of 1601  explicitly  confirms  the  responsibility
of the  state  to support  the  same  kind  of individuals  that  were  being  supported
by poor  relief  in  the  late  19th  century:  the  old,  the  disabled,  widows,
orphans,  and large  families  (Smith,  1981,  p. 607).  Evidence  from  four  English
communities  suggests  that  one  out  of every  five  households  were  on some  kind
of relief  in the  18th  century  (Smith,  1984,  pp.  444-6),  and  that  the
generosity  of state  old-age  pensions  were  in 1834  twice  what  they  were in  1984
and  even  before  Thatcher  (Thomson,  1984,  pp.  452-3).  New  York  jt.ate  relief
programs  at the  start  of the  19th  century,  and  just  prior  to the  industrial
revolution,  were as large  a share  of the  state  budget  as federal  welfare
programs  are in the  US budget  today (Hannon,  3986,  pp. 1-3).  So much  for  the
myth  that  state  welfare  programs  are  an invention  of modern  governments.  And
so  much for  the  myth that  the  innustrial  revolution  displaced  traditional
family  safety  nets.
The  existence  of pre-industrial  state  support  systems  is explained  in
p.rt  by the  absence  of extended  family  networks.  Nuclear  family  systems  bring
with  them  nuclear  family  risks.  Formal  state  relief  systems  were  a means  of
spreading  those  risks.  But  not  all the  poverty  relieved  by state  intervention
in  pre-industrial  England  was  attributable  to the  life-cycle  of  nuclear
families.  Nor was  the  interventioij  solely  restricted  to poor  relief.  Robert
-84-Fogel  (1989)  has  shown  that  food  price  intervention  was  regularly  used  by the
early  modern  state  in  England  to prevent  famine.  Like  Amartya  Sen's  work  on
India,  Fogel  shifted  our  attention  away  from  food  shortage  and towards  low
price  elasticity  of food  demand.  In  local  grain  markets  only  poorly  linked  to
national  markets,  prices  rose  sharply  to eliminate  excess  demand,  and  in the
absence  of relief,  poor  net  consumers  of food  could  be forced  into
starvation.  Price  intervention  muted  local  famines  in  pre-industrial  England.
And later,  when  food  prices  soared  during  the  Napoleonic  War, the  Speenhamland
system  was  created  to supplement  wages  of the  poor.
This  sympathetic  attitude  towards  poverty  and  generous  safety  nets  for
the  poor  did  not  persist  after  the  Napoleonic  Wars  when  the  industrial
revolution  gathered  steam.  And  we see  roughly  the  same  swing  in attitude  and
policy  in  the  United  States.
The  most  recurrent  argument  against  poor  relief  on both  sides  of the
Atlantic  was  that  the  poor  were  to blame  for  their  fate,  and  that  charity  and
relief  merely  removed  the  will  to work.  There  is little  sympithy  to be found
for  example  in this  quotation  from  an early  19th  century  British  Parliamentary
Report  on Vagrancy:
Vagrants  have  but  one  object  'n  all  their  wicked  and  perverse
lives  --  to exist  without  work  at the  expense  of their  industrious
neighbors.  [In  all  the  army  of tramps]  there  is  no ...  element  of
honest  poverty  or of penniless  industry  ...  (quoted  in  Ford  and
Ford,  1969,  p. 245).
Similarly,  the  New  York  Society  for  the  Prevention  ot Pauperism  in 1818  listed
the  many  causes  of pauperism  as:  ignorance,  idleness,  intemperpnce,
extravagant  expenditure,  imprudent  and  hasty  marriage,  lotteries,  pawnbrokers
-85-(who  encouraged  theft),  prostitution,  gambling,  and  the  charitable
institutions  and  societies  which,  despite  Cbristian  motives  and  philantbropic
zeal,  encouraged  laziness,  fostered  reliance  on benevolence,  and  could  never
"effect  the  removal  of pauperism  nor lessen  its  general  amount"  (Hannol,  1986,
p. 14).
These  arguments  were  not  new  even then.  The  same  debates  about  who  w3re
and  who  were  not  the  "deserving  poor"  are to  be found  in  medieval  writing.
The  difference  is that  these  hostile  views  toward  the  poor  this  time  did  not
go unanswered.  And  many  who  now in the  early  19th  century  opposed  the
generosity  of  poor relief  or who  called  for  a more  stringent  "workhouse  test"
were  hardly  very  subtle  in  expressing  their  hostility.  The  most important
proponent  of tighter  rules  in the  early  19th  century  was  Malthus  himself.
Malthus  agreed  that  society  had  an obligation  to support  the  most  needy,
especially  the  old,  but  he believed  that  by supporting  large  families,  poor
relief  encouraged  population  growth  and thus  depressed  wages.  A similar
argument  has recently  resurfaced  about  English  and  American  19th  century  poor
laws  (Boyer,  forthcoming;  Hannon,  1986).  In  its  modern  guise,  labor  migration
takes  the  place  of fertility  and  mortality,  and  implicit  contract  theory  takes
the  place  of  Nalthusian  demographics.  But the  story  is familiar.  By offering
poor relief  to  seasonally  and  cyclically  idle  farm  laborers,  out-migration  is
reduced  and  labor  is  made  locally  available  for  the  seasonal  and  cyclical
peaks.  Vithrut  such  poor  relief,  employers  who  needed  labor  at times  of peak
demand  would  have  had to  offer  higher  wages  and  long  term  contracts.  Boyer  and
Hannon  argue  that  early  19th  century  poor  relief  in  Britain  and  America  was  a
way for  employers  to  shift  part  of the  cost  of their  implicit  contracts  with
their  workers  onto  the  state.
Two  other  arguments  used  against  generous  poor  relief  should  be familiar
to those  who  follow  contemporary  debates  over  welfare  reform.  Opponents  of
-86-outrelief  were  constantly  wor-ied  that  relief  reduced  incentives  to  work  and
save.  The  Victorians  appear  to  have understood  the  arguments  against  welfare
programs  just  as clearly  as modern  economists  who  have  made their  names  by
restating  those  arguments.  Indeed,  in  proposing  workhouse  tests  to  determine
the  needy,  one  could  argue  that  the  Victorians  were  more subtle  in  handling
the  welfpre  trade-off  than  are  those  who  call  for  savage  cuts  in  welfare
programs  today.
Victorian  opponents  of poor  relief  also  argued  that  it  was  socially
damaging  in that  it undercut  family  and  charitable  responsibility.  Nineteenth
century  writers  also  believed  the  myth  that  the  family  supplied  support  for
the  needy  in the  pre-industrial  age.  By cutting  poor  relief,  they  thought  the
mythical  golden  age  would  resurrect  itself.  It  was  both  odd  and  inconsistent
that  the  champions  of self-relialAce,  who  argued  for  a reduction  of poor
relief,  also  called  for  a restoration  of "traditional"  safety  nets (Crowther,
1981).
Opponents  of relief  were eager  that  benefits  should  not  become  an
entitlement  or a right  of the  poor like,  for  example,  trial  by jury.  The  myth
that  state  benefits  were  a recent  substitute  for  extended  family  support  and
private  charity  helped  to support  the  mnvth  that  formal  benefits  were  not a
"traditional"  expectation.  Many  proponents  of relief,  however,  did  see them  as
an  e,titlement.  Indeed,  local  authorities  in  both  Britain  and  America  were
obliged  to  provide  some  form  of relief  alL,it  often  limited  to  the  workhouse.
The  poor  themselves  seem  at times  to  have  felt  that  a right  was  being  violated
when  relief  was cut  or  when laissez-faire  policies  of non-market-intervention
were  pursued  during  times  of high  priees  and  low  wages (see  especially,
Thompson,  1971).  Contemporaries  were  not  unaware  that  these  laissez-faire
policies  and  reductions  in  poor  relief,  both  of  which  coincided  with
industrialization,  represented  transfers  of entitlements  from  the  poor  to the
-87-rich.
The  main swings  in  attitudes  towards  poor  relief  and  poverty  were  as
follows.  Toward  the  start  of the  18th  century  there  was an attempt  to tighten
the  workhouse  test.  In  response  to heightened  seasonal  unemployment  (in  the
wake  of encl  cure  and  crop  mix changes)  and  to  high food  prices  (in  the  wake
of the  Napoleonic  Wars),  poor  relief  became  more  generous  by the  end  of the
century  (Rose,  1971,  Chp. 1).  The  first  part  of the  19th  century  saw  the
emergence  of an increasing  concern  about  outrelief  to the  ablebodied  as well
as the  generosity  of that  relief.  The  debate  became  heated  on both  sides  of
the  Atlantic.  It culminated  with  the  passage  in 1824  of a tougher  New  York
State  poor  law  and  by a tougher  New  Poor  Law  in  England  in 1834.  Both  laws
aimed  to  restrict  outdoor  relief.  In the  1870s,  again  on both  sides  of the
Atlantic,  there  was  a so-called  crusade  against  outrelief  (Hannon,  1984a,
1985,  1986;  MacKinnon,  1987).  During  this  period,  outrelief  was cut  for  many
disadvanta-ed  groups  including  widows  and the  elderly.  Late  in the  century,  we
see  some  loosening  up  and  an increased  interest  by social  reformers  in the
poor,  the  most  famous  of  which  being  Booth  and  Rowntree.  While  both  attributed
a  great  deal  of poverty  to the  actions  of the  poor,  they  found  much  more
"innocent"  poverty  than  others  had  believed  existed.
The  1900s  are  often  seen  as laying  the  foundation  of modern  welfarism.  By
1914,  England  had old  age  pensions,  some  public  "make-work"  schemes,  and  less
harsh  attitudes  towards  the  poor.  This  liberal  surge  around  World  War  T
ushered  in  what  Lindert  identifies  as a  widespread  shift  in attitudes  among
the  NICs  of that  time,  that  is,  the  rise  of redistributive  schemes  that  had  a
significant  impact  on post-fisc  income  distributions.  We should  not  forget,
however,  that  the  rise  of the  20th  century  welfare  state  represents  a return
to the  more liberal  attitudes  towards  the  poor  in pre-industrial  Europe  and
America.  It was  only  during  the  interim  that  19th  century  industrializing
-88-nations  retreated  from  those  liberal  attitudes.
What  was  the  effect  of the  less  generous  relief  in Victorian  England?  For
much  of the  poor,  it is  hard  to say.  We can  be fairly  sure,  however,  that  the
old  were  made  much  worse  off.  Figure  13 shows  old-age  pensions  as a percent  of
working-class  adult  incomes  (Thomson,  1984,  p. 453).  The sharp  decline  in  old
age  support  in the  1870s  was  large  enough  to imply  an absolute  fall  in  the
income  of the  elderly.  Perhaps  in the  long  run  the  response  would  have  been
later  retirement  and  an increase  in  saving  --  as  hoped  for  by Victorian  and
modern  opponents  of social  security,  but that  would  not  have  helped  those
already  old.  Indeed,  there  was  a marked  increase  in  the  proportion  of those
over  65 in the  workhouse  during  the  1870s  and  a similar  increase  in the  ratio
of inside  to total  non-ableboaiecd  paupers  (a  group  that  includes  the  old)  in
the  same  period.  Thomson  (1983)  found  that  more old  people  entered  the
workhouse  and  many  more  of thos';  who  entered  never  left (but  died  tbere).
MacKinnon  (1984,  p. 328)  calculates  that  had  there  been no crusade  against
outrelief,  there  would  have  been 200,000  more  old  people  given  some  outrelief
in 1900,  and  the  average  working-class  old  person's  income  would  bave  been 8%
higher.  Recall  that  the  elderly  represented  a large  portion  of the  extreme
poor,  and  they  may  have  been  falling  further  behind  in the  late  19th  century
as secondary  and  craft  employment  possibilities  disappeared.  While  policy  had
a powerful  negative  impact  on the  elderly  poor  in the  1870s,  it bad  an equally
powerful  pcsitive  impact  in the  early  20th  century.  Following  the  introduction
of old  age  pensions  in 1911,  by 1913  outdoor  patperism  among  the  elderly  had
fallen  to 5% of its  1906  level.
What  have -e learned  about  safety  nets?  While  it  may  be convenient  to
think  otherwise,  typically  the  poor in  pre-industrial  European  and  North
American  societies  were  not  supported  by the  family  and  private  institutions.
In most  leading  19th  century  industrializers,  a large  part  of the
-89-responsibility  lay  with the  state  and  other  formal,  state-like  institutions.
These  bodies  intervened  in food  markets  and  their  interventions  mattered  to
the  living  standards  of the  poor.  Where  laissez-faire  policies  were  adopted
during  the  industrial  revolution,  as in America  and  England,  many  of the  poor
were  big losers.  The  removal  of traditional  pre-industrial  safety  nets  by
laissez-faire-driven  19th  century  industrial  revolutions  was viewed  by many  as
the  theft  of what  had  come  to be seen  as a property  right.  We do not  yet  know
by  how much  this  "theft"  hurt  the  poor,  but it  clearly  mattered  to those  in
extreme  poverty  at the  bottom  of the  income  distribution.
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-98-Table  1.  Conjectures  on British  Income  Inequality  Trends,  1688-1913
Income  Shares  (%)  Atkinson  Index
Date  of original  Gini  Bottom  40-65%  65-90%  Top  Top  =  t=  E  =
observation  coefficient  40%  group  group  10%  5%  1.5  2.5  4.0
England  and  Vales
1688  0.468  15.4  16.7  26.0  42.0  27.6  0.393  0.491 0.569
1759  0.487  15.8  14.1  25.8  44.4  31.2  0.399  0.474 0.531
1801/3  0.519  13.4  13.3  28.0  45.4  29.8  0.450 0.542  0.607
1867  0.551  14.8  11.7  20.8  52.7  45.1  0.473  0.523 0.562
United  Kingdom
1867  0.538  15.2  32.4  52.4  46.8  0.464  0.510 0.547
1880  0.520  17.0  28.8  54.2  49.4  0.462  0.502  0.532
1913  0.502  17.2  33.0  49.8  43.8  0.427  0.475 0.522
Source: Villiaason  (1985),  Table  4.5,  p. 68.
-99-Table  2. Wealth  Inequality  in  the  United  States,  1774-1962
Shbzre  held  Share  held  Gini
bv  Top 1%  by  Top  10%  Coefficient
1774
Free  households  12.6%  49.6*  .642
All  households  14.8  55.1  n.a.
Free  adult  males  12.4  48.7  .632
All  adult  males  13.2  54.3  n.a.
1860
Free  adult  males  29.0  73.0  .832
Adult  males  30.3-35.0  74.6-79.0  n.a.
1870
Adult  males  27.0  70.0  .833
1962
All  consumer  units  15.1  35.7  n.a.
Source:  Williamson  and  Lindert  (1980),  Table  3.1,  pp.  38-39.
-100-Table  3.  Expenditure  Shares  of Urban  Poor  in the  19th  Century
Expenditure  Shares  (M)  for:
Item  Food  Rent,  Fuel,  Clothing  Other
& Lighting
Massachusetts  unskilled  city  poor
in 1875: Williamson  & Lindert,
1980,  p. 107  68.9  20.6  4.1  6.4
London  unskilled  city  poor,  1795-
1845: Williamson,  1985,  p. 210  63.8  23.2  13.0  -
Late  19th  Century  Northampton,
England: Bowley  and  Burnett-
Hurst,  1915,  p. 24.












-101-Table  4. Cost-of-Living  in  American  Eastern  Cities,  1820-1839























Source:  Williamson  (1976),  p.  315
-102-Table  5.  The  Terms  of Trade  in Britain  Between  Food and  Textiles,  1820-40
Food  Price  Textile  Price  Food
Year  Index  Index  Textiles
(1820=100)
1820  148.8  374.9  100.0
1821  131.3  363.5  91.0
1822  117.3  326.7  90.4
1823  128.6  302.3  107.2
1824  143.8  295.8  122.5
1825  1A4.8  298.0  130.8
1826  138.9  253.4  138.1
1827  134.8  245.0  138.6
1828  137.9  231.9  149.8
1829  142.9  205.5  175.2
1830  139.1  209.4  167.3
1831  142.7  198.4  1R1.2
1832  134.0  176.5  1'1.2
1833  120.8  176.2  172.7
1834  111.1  179.5  155.9
1835  103.1  194.5  133.5
1836  122.5  192.5  160.3
1837  130.3  166.1  197.h
1838  143.3  157.0  229.9
1839  152.7  155.0  248.2
1840  150.2  140.7  268.9
Source: Data  underlying  Lindert  and  Williamson  (1983).
-103-table  6.  Trends  in  English  City  Rents  1790-1840
(percent  per  annum  growth)
Period
1790-1839/40  1790-1839/42  1800-40
Black  Country  Town  Rents  1.7%
Leeds  Rents
Demand  side  estimate  2.0%
Supply  side  estimate  3.6
Avewage  2.8
Trentham  (Staffs)  Rents  2.9%
Cost-of-Living  0.3  0.3  -0.9
Rents  Relative  to Cost-of-Living  2.5  2.6  2.6
Source: Williamson  (forthcoming),  Table  9.1.
-104-Table  7.  Infant  Mortality  Rates  in  England's  Cities  and  Countrysida,
1841,  1871,  and  1?06 (deaths  per 1000)
Region  1906  1871  1841
North
Benign  Countryside  145.3  156.1  114.8
Ugly  Cities  148.8  212.1  174.5
Difference  +3.5  +56.0  +59.7
York
Benign  Countryside  138.9  163.5  138.3
Ugly  Cities  149.5  189.4  171.7
Difference  +10.6  +25.9  +33.4
Lancs-Cheshire
Benign  Countryside  143.4  172.3  154.7
Ugly  Cities  164.1  195.6  198.2
Difference  +20.7  +23.3  +43.5
Midlands
Benign  Countryside  116.8  124.9  137.0
Ugly  Cities  145.4  193.2  190.2
Difference  +28.6  +68.3  +53.2
last  and  South
Benigh  Countryside  110.5  154.3  129.8
Ugly Cities  133.0  170.9  173.2
Difference  +22.5  +16.6  +43.3
Source: Williamson  (forthcoming),  Table  9.3.
-105-Table  8.  Regression  Results: English  Pauper.sm  and  Poverty  in 1899
Rearession
(1)  Linear  (2)  Log  1linear
Dependant  Var:  ASOP  Dependent  Var:  LOG  ASOP
Coefficient  Coefficient
(S.E.)  (S.E.)
Constant  0.0684  Constant  -1.2740
LOWINC  0.2841  LOGLOVINC  1.5433
(0.1192)  (0.4s92)
INRAT  -0.1433  LOGINRAT  -0.2094
(0.0817)  (0.1448i
LOINRAT  0.0369  LOGLJNINRAT  -0.3905
(0.0758)  (0.3905)
R Squared:  .4193  .5433
Number  of observations:  28  28
Notes:
ASOP:  The  adjusted  number  of old  outdoor  paupers  in the  sample  area
divided  hy total  old  population.  The  report  only  gives  the
number  who had  ever  been  on relief.  We used  the  difference  between
the  number  on low  income  considered  ineligible  for  relief.  This
number  is always  the  same  or slightly  below  the  number  ever  on
relief.  It excludes  those  who  had  been  on relief  but  were no
longer  poor.  ASOP  was  very  closely  correlated  to outdoor  relief
ratios  in  the  corresponding  union.
LOWINC:  The  number  of old  in the  sample  with  weekly  income  below  10s.
divided  by the  number  whose  incomes  were  known.
INRAT:  The  number  of old  indoor  paupers  divided  by total  old  paupers  in
the  corresponding  poor  law  union  in  1903.
LONINRAT:  A dummy  for  London  multiplied  by INRAT  to correct  for  metropolitan
high indoor  ratios  due  to  hospitals  etc.
-106-Table  9. Local  Relief  Recipients  per  1000  Population,
New  York  State,  1835-1895
Year  New  York  State  b.Y.  City  Rest  of  State
1835  18.69  84.03  8.73
1840  25.17  88.11  .5.27
1846  38.51  146.43  18.93
1850  42.26  97.47  29.13
1855  65.04  160.61  39.73
1860  65.93  138.42  42.33
1865  81.10  233.98  39.95
1870  51.50  85.43  40.96
1874  68.49  130.68  47.77
1880  55.03  124.79  28.79
1885  39.84  86.72  22.42
1890  35.21  64.74  21.59
1895  35.07  54.03  26.96
Notes:  There  is  no  figure  for  1845. The  figures  for  1875  are  out  of  line
with  the  neighboring  years.  They  are  101.43;  253.40;  and  53.38
respectively.
Source:  Hannon  (1986),  Appendix  A,  pp.9-10.
-107-Table  10. County  Pauper  Statistics,  England  & Wales,  1803-4
Total  Paupers  Indoor/Total
Region  per  Population  Paupers
England  and  Wales  11.4%  8.0%
"Industrial  Counties"  9.5%  10.9%
"Agricultural  Counties"  16.1%  7.7%
"Industrial  counties"  excluding
Middlesex  and  Surrey  (i.e.  London)  9.8%  7.2%
Note:  "Agricultural  and  Industrial"  are  as  detined  in  the  original
Parlianentary  Pauers. Williams  (1981),  p. 150-1.
-108-Table  11. Pauper  Rates  by  Urbanization,  England  and  Wales
Region  Total  Paupers  per  1000
in  1906
London  29.83
Other  Wholly  Urban  25.33
Nixed  Urban-Rural:
)  75%  Urban  22.98
50-75%  Urban  23  .29
25-50%  Urban  25.46
(  25%  Urban  26.74
Wholly  Rural  24.28
Source:  These  figures  are  corrected  for  sex  and  age  constitution  of  the
population.  P.P.  (1910).  Vol.  LIII,  Cd.  5077,  Appendix  XXV.  Vol.
LIII,  p.  390.
-109-Table  12. Percentage  of  Working-Class  Households







Source:  Rennock  (1987),  p.  225.
-110-Table  13. Trends  in  Old  Age  Pauperism,
Enaland  and  wales,  1851-1911
Indoor  PauDers  Aoed  Over  65
Adult  Non-Able  Bodied  Paupers  As  a  %  of  As  $  of
Year  as  a  Percentage  Age  Group  in  All  Paupers
of  All  Paupers  Population
1851  42.1  3.0  19.8
1861  43.0  3.2  23.4
1871  41.6  3.6  26.0
1881  44.1  - -
1891  46.8  4.3  32.6
1901  48.7  5.0  36.5
1911  42.2  4.4  31.7
Source:  Williams  (1981),  pp.  204-5.
-111-Table  14. Breakdown  of  Child  Paupers,  England  and  Vales,  1908
Item  Proportion  of  all  Pauper  Children
Children  aged  <  16  with:
sarried  couples  22.1%
widowers  1.3
married  men  without  wives  2.2
widows  43.0
married  women  without  husbands  8.8
mothers  of  illegitimates  2.9
Orphans  and  deserted  children  19.7
100.0
Children  as  a  proportion  of  all  paupers:  29.2%
Source:  Calculated  from  data  in  P.P.  (1910),  LIII,  App  XXV,  p.  32.
-112-Table  15. Ratio  of  Female  Pauper  Rates  to  Male  Pauper  Rates,
England  and  Wales,  1906
Age  Groups  Ratio  of  Pauper  Rates
16  to  20  1.30
20  to  25  1.46
25  to  35  1.77
35  to  45  1.92
45  to  55  1.32
55  to  60  1.09
60  to  65  1.19
over  65  1.23
This  table  is  Dq_ the  gender  ratio  of  numbers  of  paupers  in  each
age  group.  The  ratio  of  the  number  of  paupers  in  eacb  sex  and
gender  group  to  the  total  size  of  that  group  in  the  population  has
first  been  calculated.  The  table  shows  the  gender  ratio  of  these
pauper  rates.  Calculated  from  data  in  P.P.  (1910),  LIII,  App.
XXV,  p.56.
-113-Table  16.  Pauperism  among  Widows  and  Cbildren,
England  and  Wales,  1870s  and  1880s
Column  A:  Able-bodied  widows  with  dependent  children  aged  less  than  16  on
outdoor  relief  as a percentage  of all  paupers.
Columun  B:  Able-bodied  widows  from  column  A as a percentage  of all  widows
aged  20-45.
Column  C:  All  pauper  children  as  a percentage  of all  paupers.
Column  D:  Children  per  pauper  widow.
Year  A  B  C  D
1841  13.5  --  --  2.6
1851  21.0  39.2  38.6  2.4
1861  19.6  34.6  36.2  2.5
1871  19.8  36.0  36.2  2.6
1884  20.7  22.9  33.3  2.9
1891  18.8  20.7  30.4  2.9
1901  16.5  18.6  26.4  2.9
1911  14.3  19.9  28.7  2.8
Notes:  The 1841  figures  are  counted  in a slightly  different  way but
Williams  believes  that  they  are  compatible. Cols  A. and  B. are
1872. Col  C. is 1886.  Col  B.  uses 1881  census  data  for
denominator.  Williams  (1981),  pp.  197-201.
-114-Table  17.  Principal  Immediate  Causes  of  Poverty  in  Five  English  'towns
(%  of  Poor  Households  Below  Rowntree  Standard)
Immediate  Cause  Northampton  Warrington  Bolton  Reading  York
1913  1913  1914  1913  1899
Chief  wage  earner:
Dead  21  6  35  ;4  27
Ill  or old  14  1  17  11  10
Unemployed  - 3  3  2  3
Irregularly  employed  3  6  4  3
Chief  wage  earner
regularly  employed
kit
Wages  insufficient  for
3 children
Families  of:
3  children  or less  21  22  20  33
4 children  or more  9  38  9  15
57
Wages  sufficient  for
3 children  but  4
children  or more  in
family  35  27  10  21
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Sources: Bowley  and  Burnett-Hurst  (1915),  p. 408. Bowley  and  Hogg (1925),  p.
158.
-115-Table  18. Examples  of  Rates  of  Male  Pauperism  in  Various  Industries,
England  and  Wales,  1906
Total  Adult  Male  Paupers  Occupied  and  Formerly
Occup3tion  Groups  in  the  Sector  in  1905,  per  10..>J  Adult  Males
Occupied  in  the  Same  Sector  in  1901
General  Laborers,  etc.  848.6
Fishing  403.3
Agriculture  397.3
Dress,  etc.  239.6
Building,  etc.  220.7
Mines,  etc.  168.1
Metals,  etc.  139.8
Textiles  129.0
Cbemicals,  etc.  79.6
Professional  Occupations  and
Subordinate  Services  41.2
Defense  33.9
Commercial  Operations  51.2
Average  England  and  Vales  213.0
Source:  P.P.  (1910),  LII,  p.  113.
-116-Table  19.  Characteristics  of Local  Relief  Recipients,
New York  State,  1843-1874
(Five  year averages)
Percent  1843-44  1845-49  1850-54  1855-59  1860-64  1865-69  1870-74
Adult  76.13  88.74  79.83  86.83  90.89  91.06  86.47
Children  23.87  11.26  20.17  13.17  9.11  8.94  13.53
Male  58.72  56.76  51.60  46.28  40.47  42.29  55.08
Female  41.28  43.24  48.40  53.72  59.53  57.71  44.92
Native  born  50.83  43.15  39.02  41.65  39.15  38.97  37.23
Foreign  born  49.17  56.85  60.98  58.35  60.85  51.03  62.77
Disabled  9.20  9.67  4.77  2.73  2.59  2.77  5.91
Elderly  5.18  2.71  3.09  1.85  1.50  1.44  3.46
Sick  19.71  24.32  13.59  9.05  7.12  9.78  19.30
Spouse  0.57  2.60  4.54  2.91  2.26  2.06  6.51
Able-bodied  adult:  41.46  49.40  53.83  70.30  77.19  75.00  51.29
Male  24.97  28.92  27.26  29.57  28.48  29.59  27.93
Female  16.49  20.48  26.57  40.73  48.71  45.41  23.36
Intemperate  26.44  18.63  11.29  8.41  8.88  10.36  19.47
Debauched  2.65  1.99  1.06  0.51  0.61  0.50  1.23
Idle  and  vagrant  1.52  1.44  3.66  3.70  2.52  0.82  1.75
indigent  and  destitute 10.85  27.34  37.82  57.68  65.18  63.32  28.84
Other  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.22  0.01  0.00
Source: Hannon  (1986),  p. 97
-117-Table  20.  Female  Pauper  Rates  in Various  Industries,
England  and  Wales,  1906
Female  Paupers  Over  Age 16
Occupied  or Formerly  Occupiei
in the  Industries  Mentioned  Absolute  Number
Occupation  Group  in the  First  Column  in 1906,  of Female
per  10,000  Females  over  15  Paupers  in  Group
Occupied  in the  Same  Industry
in  1901
Domestic  Offices
or Services'  592.5  98,101
Agriculture  688.6  3,923
Textiles 2 193.9  11,926
Dress  356.7  27,649
General  Undefined
Workers  and  Dealers$  1081.1  4,761
Average  England  and  Wales  300.0
Total  England  and  Wales  - 200,697
Notes:  'In  this  group,  76%  of the  paupers  were  eitber  charwomen  or laundry
and  washing  services.
2Despite  the  dominance  of cotton,  wool,  worsted  and  silk,  40%  of the
paupers  in this  group  were  listed  as other  textile  manufacture.
366%  of the  paupers  in this  group  were  listed  as "costermongers,
hawkers  and  street  sell3rs".
Source: P.P. (1910),  LIII,  pp.  114,  416.
-118-Table  21.  Estimating  the  Impact  of an  Early  Repeal  of the  Corn  Laws




Output  (Constant  Price)
Agriculture  -6
Industry  +4
Rents,  Profits,  Wages  and  GNP
Agricultural  Rents  -20
Profits  in Industry  +1
Real  Unskilled  Wage  +23
Nominal  -1
Workers'  Cost-of-Living  -25
Real  Skilled  Wage  +15
Nominal  +1
Workers'  Cost-of-Living  -14-
Real  GNP  Per  Capita  +2
source: Williamson  (1986),  Table  3.
-119-Table  22.  Average  (ACOR)  and  Incremental  (ICOR)  Capital-Output  Ratios:
Britain  1800-1860  Compared  with  Other  Industrial  Revolutions
PANEL  A
Britain: ACOR  1800  1830  1860
Total  5.21  3.81  3.55
Agriculture  5.93  4.69  3.72
Industry,  commerce  & transport  3.27  2.58  1,29
Total  less  agriculture  4.87  3.54  3.52
Total  less  agriculture,
housing  &  public  works  2.15  1.90  2.47
Britain: ICOR  1800-1830  1830-1860  1800-1860
Total  2.65  3.32  3.10
Industry,  commerce  & transport  2.19  3.86  3.30
Total  liess  agriculture
housing  & public  works  1.74  2.94  2.54
PANEL  B
20th  Century: ICOR  1950s  1885/89-1914/18
Total: Ten  countries  4.1
Total: Low-income  countries  3.4
Total: Japan  2.9
PANEL  C
Late 19th  Century: ICOR  Period  ICOR
Germany  1851/55-1911/13  7.4
Italy  1861-1914/16  9.6
Denmark  1870-1914  3.9
Norway  1865-1910/19  6.3
Sweden  1861-1911/20  4.1
Unweighted  average  6.3
UK  1851/61-1905/14  4.1
Source: Williamson  (forthcoming),  Table  10.1.
-120-Table  25. Capital  Stock  Growth  Per  Capita  by  Use: 1760-1860
(percent  per  annum)
Use  1760-1800 1800-1830 1830-1860  1800-1860
Social  overhead  capital  -0.13  0.10  0.39  0.24
Dwellings  -0.13  0.12  0.27  0.19
Public  works  &  buildings  -0.10  -0.09  1.43  0.67
All  other  fixed  capital  0.44  0.27  1.43  0.85
Total  fixed  capital  0.21  0.21  1.09  0.65
Source:  Williamson  (forthcoming),  Table  10.2.
-121-Table  24.  Were  Britain's  Cities  Labor-Initensive?  Capital-Labor  Ratios,  1800-1860
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Direct  Fixed  Capital  Direct  Fixed  Capital  Plus  Housing  Total  Fixed  Capital
Year  Agriculture  Non-Agriculture Ratio  Agriculture  Non-Agriculture Ratio  Rural Urban  Ratio
f  £  (2)/(1)  f  f  (5)l(4)  £  £  (8)/(7)
1800  63.5  67.7  1.07  108.4  81.7  .75
1810  66.1  65.9  .99  113.7  80.5  .71
1820  72.8  60.9  .84  128.6  75.9  .59
1830  76.1  65.5  .86  145.3  82.7  .57
1840  76.8  82.1  1.07  157.2  102.2  .65  172.5  94.0  .54
1850  77.6  98.9  1.27  151.4  117.9  .78  178.4  106.5  .60
1860  90.0  110.4  1.23  179.7  128.4  .71  211.3  117.0  .55
Source: Williamson  (forthcoming),  Table  10.3.
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Figure  8. Life  Cycle  Employment  Patterns  of  Males
In Chilvers  Coton  in 1851  and  1901
Source:  Quadagno,  1982,  pp. 78-9.
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and  1901
Source:  Quadagno,  1982,  pp. 72-3.
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Figure  10.  Male SOeasonal  Distribution  of
Unemployment  Before  and  After  Enclosure,
Seven  Counties  in England
Source:  Snell,  1985,  p. 148.
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